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I.   INTRODUCTION 
 The field of neuroethics has been described as an amalgamation of 
two branches of inquiry: “the neuroscience of ethics” and “the ethics 
of neuroscience.”1 The neuroscience of ethics may be described as “a 
scientific approach to understanding ethical behavior.”2 The law and 
ethics of neuroscience is concerned with the legal and ethical princi-
ples that should guide brain research and the treatment of neurologi-
                                                                                                                    
 * Assistant Professor of Law, Hamline University School of Law. I am grateful to 
Bill Winslade, Cheryl Ellis Vaiani, Judy Illes, Ron Carson, and Melvyn Schreiber for their 
comments on earlier versions of this Article; Maité Morales-Martínez for her outstanding 
research assistance; and Regina Watson and Barb Kallusky in the Hamline Law Library 
for their assistance with locating difficult sources. 
 1. Adina Roskies, A Case Study of Neuroethics: The Nature of Moral Judgment, in 
NEUROETHICS: DEFINING THE ISSUES IN THEORY, PRACTICE, AND POLICY 17, 18 (Judy Illes 
ed., 2006). 
 2. Id. 
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cal disease, as well as the effects that advances in neuroscience have 
on our social, moral, and philosophical views.3 This Article is a con-
tribution to the law and ethics of neuroscience. 
 No longer new4 or emerging, the burgeoning5 field of neuroethics 
has an expanding literature that includes several edited collections,6 
journal symposia,7 and stand-alone texts.8 Based on topics as varied 
as neurodegenerative disease, functional neuroimaging, incidental 
neuroimaging findings, transcranial magnetic stimulation, functional 
neurosurgical interventions, and cognitive enhancement, neuroethics 
has developed alongside its neuroeconomics9 and neuropolitics10 
counterparts and is followed by triple-disciplinary fields such as law 
and neuroeconomics.11 In this Article, I focus on one small part of the 
field of neuroethics: the confidentiality, privacy, and identity implica-
tions of advances in functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI). 
 Now in its second decade, fMRI identifies localized changes in 
blood oxygenation that occur in the brain when an individual per-
                                                                                                                    
 3. See id. 
 4. Arthur L. Caplan, Foreword to NEUROETHICS: DEFINING THE ISSUES IN THEORY, 
PRACTICE, AND POLICY vii, vii (Judy Illes ed., 2006). 
 5. Jeff Stryker, How Brainwashing Came to Life and Thrived, SAN FRAN. CHRON., 
Aug. 1, 2004, at E1. 
 6. See, e.g., SEMIR ZEKI & OLIVER GOODENOUGH, LAW AND THE BRAIN (2006); 
NEUROETHICS: DEFINING THE ISSUES IN THEORY, PRACTICE, AND POLICY (Judy Illes ed., 
2006); NEUROSCIENCE AND THE LAW: BRAIN, MIND, AND THE SCALES OF JUSTICE (Brent 
Garland ed., 2004); NEUROETHICS: MAPPING THE FIELD (Steven J. Marcus ed., 2002); Wal-
ter Glannon, Defining Right and Wrong in Brain Science: Essential Recordings in Neuro-
ethics (2007). 
 7. See, e.g., Symposium, Brain Imaging and the Law, 33 AM. J.L. & MED. (forthcom-
ing 2007); Symposium, What Can Neuroscience Contribute to Ethics?, 32 J. MED. ETHICS 63 
(2006); Symposium, It’s Time to Go Public with Neuroethics, AM. J. BIOETHICS, Mar.-Apr. 
2005, at I-63; Symposium, Neuroethics: An Emerging New Discipline in the Study of Brain 
and Cognition, 50 BRAIN & COGNITION 341 (2002). 
 8. See, e.g., SANDRA J. ACKERMAN, HARD SCIENCE, HARD CHOICES: FACTS, ETHICS, 
AND POLICIES GUIDING BRAIN SCIENCE TODAY (2006); MICHAEL S. GAZZANIGA, THE 
ETHICAL BRAIN (2005); NEIL LEVY, NEUROETHICS: CHALLENGES FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 
(2007);  STEVEN ROSE, THE FUTURE OF THE BRAIN: THE PROMISE AND PERILS OF 
TOMORROW’S NEUROSCIENCE (2005); LAURENCE R. TANCREDI, HARDWIRED BEHAVIOR: 
WHAT NEUROSCIENCE REVEALS ABOUT MORALITY (2005); THE NEW BRAIN SCIENCES: 
PERILS AND PROSPECTS (Dai Rees & Steven Rose, eds., 2004). 
 9. See generally Colin Camerer et al., Neuroeconomics: How Neuroscience Can In-
form Economics, 43 J. ECON. LITERATURE 9 (2005); Colin F. Camerer et al., Neuroeconom-
ics: Why Economics Needs Brains, 106 SCANDINAVIAN J. ECON. 555 (2004); Colin F. 
Camerer, Strategizing in the Brain, 300 SCI. 1673 (2003); Kevin McCabe et al., Neu-
roeconomics, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COGNITIVE SCIENCE 294 (Lynn Nadel ed., 2003); Kevin 
McCabe et al., A Functional Imaging Study of Cooperation in Two-Person Reciprocal Ex-
change, 98 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 11832 (2001). 
 10. See generally WILLIAM E. CONNOLLY, NEUROPOLITICS: THINKING, CULTURE, SPEED 
(Sandra Buckley et al. eds., THEORY OUT OF BOUNDS No. 23, 2002). 
 11. See generally Terrence Chorvat et al., Law and Neuroeconomics, 13 SUP. CT. 
ECON. REV. 35 (2005). 
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forms a mental task.12 Scientists use fMRI not only to map sensory, 
motor, and cognitive function but also to study the neural correlates 
of a number of conditions, behaviors, and characteristics, such as ma-
jor depression, schizophrenia, cocaine addiction, compulsive gam-
bling, pedophilia, racial evaluation, deception, and even sexual pref-
erences.13 Now moving outside the research context, fMRI's ability to 
detect correlations between brain activations and potentially stigma-
tizing conditions and behaviors raises a number of confidentiality, 
privacy, and identity issues. 
 The neuroethics literature has been calling for an in-depth analy-
sis of these issues. Science editor Donald Kennedy suggested in 2002 
that fMRI could jeopardize confidentiality and privacy.14 Judy Illes, 
Director of the Program in Neuroethics at the Stanford Center for 
Biomedical Ethics, requested legal consideration of the need for addi-
tional confidentiality and privacy protections for thought processes in 
2003.15 University of Pennsylvania psychologist Martha Farah ex-
pressed similar concerns in 2004.16 Harvard criminal law scholar Wil-
liam Stuntz pondered in 2005 the pressure that fMRI could place on 
the judicial system’s understanding of privacy.17 The same year, José 
van Dijck, Professor of Media and Culture at the University of Am-
sterdam, inquired more generally regarding how the camera pushes 
the limits of privacy.18 More recently, a 2007 New York Times article 
asked how brain scanning technologies will threaten our privacy.19 
 This Article responds to these questions and concerns. Elsewhere, 
I placed the confidentiality, privacy, and identity issues raised by 
fMRI in their proper historical context.20 Here, I build on my earlier 
                                                                                                                    
 12. David G. Norris, Principles of Magnetic Resonance Assessment of Brain Function, 
23 J. MAGNETIC RESONANCE IMAGING 794-95 (2006). 
 13. See infra text accompanying notes 198-226.. 
 14. The Ethics of Brain Science: Open Your Mind, ECONOMIST, May 25, 2002, avail-
able at 2002 WLNR 10444593 (“Medical privacy is another area that brain scanning could 
compromise.”). 
 15. Judy Illes, Neuroethics in a New Era of Neuroimaging, 24 AM. J. 
NEURORADIOLOGY 1739, 1740 (2003) (“Just as the regulations of the new . . . Health Insur-
ance Portability and Accountability Act extend The Belmont Report principles and guide-
lines for the protection of human participants in research, what will protect the quantita-
tion of human thought in 2010?”). 
 16. Martha J. Farah & Paul Root Wolpe, Monitoring and Manipulating Brain Func-
tion: New Neuroscience Technologies and Their Ethical Implications, HASTINGS CENTER 
REP., May-June 2004, at 35, 36  (“Our sense of the privacy and confidentiality of our own 
thought processes may also be threatened by technologies that can reveal the neural corre-
lates of our innermost thoughts.”). 
 17. Jeffrey Rosen, Roberts v. The Future, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 28, 2005, § 6, at 24. 
 18. JOSÉ VAN DIJCK, THE TRANSPARENT BODY: A CULTURAL ANALYSIS OF MEDICAL 
IMAGING 13 (2005). 
 19. Jeffrey Rosen, The Brain on the Stand: How Neuroscience Is Transforming the Le-
gal System, N.Y TIMES MAG., Mar. 11, 2007, at 48, 50. 
 20. Phrenology, the nineteenth-century pseudoscience of the mind, was believed to be 
capable of revealing character information that individuals may have preferred to keep 
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work by examining the current confidentiality, privacy, and identity 
issues raised by fMRI. I specifically examine whether existing legal 
and ethical principles give individuals sufficient control over the use 
and disclosure of their functional neuroimaging information by third 
parties (confidentiality), the collection of their functional neuroimag-
ing information by third parties (privacy), and the self-revelation of 
their functional neuroimaging information (identity). 
 This Article proceeds as follows. Part II provides an abbreviated 
history of fMRI. Part III explores the actual and perceived scope of 
confidentiality, privacy, and identity concerns raised by advances in 
functional neuroimaging. What brain functions does fMRI actually 
reveal? What can fMRI tell us about an individual’s physical or men-
tal health condition or her social qualities and personal characteris-
tics? Can fMRI reveal whether an individual is racially prejudiced, 
deceitful, or altruistic? Whether an individual is depressed, sexually 
aroused, or capable of making moral decisions? To answer these 
questions, Part III reviews a selection of fMRI studies and explains 
why private and governmental entities are interested in obtaining 
and creating neuroimaging information and how the media, with 
some help from bioethicists and other stakeholders, may be contrib-
uting to this interest. 
 An oft-stated principle is that physicians and scientists have a le-
gal and an ethical duty to maintain the confidentiality of study and 
medical records in their possession.21 Do existing authorities ade-
quately protect an individual’s interest in the appropriate use and 
disclosure of her functional neuroimaging information? To answer 
this question, Part IV examines a selection of legal authorities, in-
cluding the Common Rule, the Privacy Rule, state confidentiality 
laws, and Public Health Service provisions providing for certificates 
of confidentiality.  
 Patients voluntarily disclose some information to health care pro-
viders to obtain health care, and human subjects consent to scien-
tists’ obtaining some personal information during research studies. 
But, what if a third party attempts to collect neuroimaging informa-
tion that an individual would prefer to keep to herself? Part V re-
sponds to this concern by analyzing the privacy issues raised by 
                                                                                                                    
private. The discovery of x-ray at the turn of the century led to the development of a num-
ber of privacy protections, including lead underwear and legislation prohibiting the use of 
x-ray glasses. The ability of computed tomography and structural magnetic resonance im-
aging to peer inside the body intensified privacy concerns, especially as the forensic value 
of these technologies became known. Old and new methods of brain mapping and neuroi-
maging raise confidentiality, privacy, and identity concerns, and history has a role in in-
forming current policy discussions about fMRI. See generally Stacey A. Tovino, Imaging 
Body Structure and Mapping Brain Function: A Historical Approach, 33 AM. J.L. & MED. 
(forthcoming 2007).  
 21. See infra Part IV. 
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fMRI. Part V is structured according to a selection of contexts in 
which neurological privacy intrusions could occur, including the 
clinical, research, employment, and insurance contexts. 
 Part VI explores the identity issues raised by fMRI. In several re-
cent studies, scientists have incidentally discovered arteriovenous 
malformations, brain tumors, developmental abnormalities, and 
other conditions in what were thought to be healthy control subjects 
who volunteered to participate in fMRI research. The possibility that 
scientists and other brain scan operators could collaterally identify 
personality traits, sexual preferences, and racial preferences is cur-
rently the subject of much debate. Part VI examines whether the law 
affords individuals adequate control over the self-revelation of their 
functional neuroimaging information. 
 Finally, Part VII addresses whether advances in functional neuro-
imaging require special or heightened confidentiality, privacy, and 
identity provisions. Building on the frameworks of HIV exceptional-
ism and genetic exceptionalism, Part VII evaluates the merits of 
neuro exceptionalism. En route to arguing that advances in neuro-
imaging technology support previous calls for generic privacy provi-
sions in the employment and insurance contexts, Part VII also ad-
dresses the roles and responsibilities of scientists, ethicists, and law-
yers in the public and neuroethics arenas. 
II.   FMRI: A BRIEF HISTORY 
 Although the science behind magnetic resonance dates back to the 
1920s,22 commercial magnetic resonance imaging scanners were not 
developed until the late 1970s.23 In 1977, Raymond Damadian and 
his FONAR Corporation built the first human nuclear magnetic 
resonance scanner, which used magnetism and radio waves to image 
internal organs and tissues.24 On July 3 of that year, Larry Minkoff, 
a postdoctoral fellow in Damadian’s laboratory, was the first human 
subject from whom data was recorded by a nuclear magnetic reso-
nance scanner.25 The resulting image, which showed a slice of Min-
koff’s chest including his heart, lungs, and surrounding muscles, took 
almost four hours to complete.26 By 1979, Damadian and other re-
searchers had used nuclear magnetic resonance imaging technology 
to create images of individuals' abdomens, upper torsos, heads, and 
brains, the latter of which had been especially difficult to obtain us-
ing x-ray.27 Around the same time, the adjective “nuclear” was 
                                                                                                                    
 22. SCOTT A. HUETTEL ET AL., FUNCTIONAL MAGNETIC RESONANCE IMAGING 11 (2004). 
 23. Id. at 19. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. at 20. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. 
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dropped from the technology due to the negative health connotations 
of the word and the fact that nuclear magnetic resonance does not 
use ionizing radiation.28 Nuclear magnetic resonance thus became 
known as magnetic resonance imaging (MRI).29 
 By the early 1980s, several companies had developed industrial 
MRI scanners with magnetic fields of 0.1 to 1.0 Tesla.30 In 1982, Gen-
eral Electric created a commercial, human-body scanner with a rela-
tively strong (1.5-Tesla) magnetic field in 1982.31 A short time later, 
hospitals began installing the scanners, which became the standard 
scanner for clinical imaging for the next twenty years.32 In 1985, the 
Food and Drug Administration approved MRI for clinical use, which 
allowed health care providers to order MRI scans and bill them to 
health insurance companies.33 By the mid-1990s, thousands of MRI 
scanners had been installed in hospitals and imaging centers across 
North America, and structural MRI had become a common diagnostic 
imaging procedure.34 
 Although MRI is capable of measuring structural differences be-
tween brain tissues, it does not measure brain function, as does func-
tional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI).35 A brief history of the 
physiological basis of fMRI is necessary to understand the fMRI stud-
ies discussed in Part III. In 1881, Italian physiologist Angelo Mosso 
recorded the pulsation of the human cortex in post-neurosurgery pa-
tients with skull defects.36 Mosso found that the “pulsations in-
creased regionally during mental activity” and concluded that “brain 
circulation changes . . . with neuronal activity.”37 In 1936, American 
chemist and Nobel Prize winner Linus Pauling and one of his stu-
dents, Charles Coryell, discovered that deoxygenated blood has ap-
proximately one-fifth more magnetic susceptibility than fully oxy-
genated blood.38 Pauling and Coryell predicted that magnetic reso-
nance pulse sequences would show different magnetic resonance sig-
nals depending on whether blood is highly oxygenated or highly de-
oxygenated.39 This prediction, which was verified in the early 1980s 
                                                                                                                    
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. at 21. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id.  
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. at 24. 
 36. Marcus E. Raichle, Functional Neuroimaging: A Historical and Physiological Per-
spective, in HANDBOOK OF FUNCTIONAL NEUROIMAGING OF COGNITION 3, 5 (Roberto Cabeza 
& Alan Kingstone eds., 2001). 
 37. Id. 
 38. HUETTEL ET AL., supra note 22, at 159-60. 
 39. Id. 
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by Keith Thulborn and his colleagues, provided a theoretical basis for 
measuring blood oxygenation changes using MRI.40 
 The possibility of using MRI to study brain physiology was first 
explored by Seiji Ogawa, a Bell Laboratories research scientist, in 
the late 1980s.41 Ogawa hypothesized that blood flow could serve as 
an indirect measure of metabolism that could be captured by MRI.42 
More specifically, Ogawa’s theory was that changes in blood flow 
would be accompanied by changes in oxygen consumption, which 
would lead to measurable changes in the amount of oxygen remain-
ing in blood vessels at the site of brain activation.43  
Ogawa tested his hypothesis by using an MRI scanner with a very 
strong (7-Tesla) magnetic field to image the brains of anesthetized 
rats while they breathed air with different amounts of oxygen.44 
Ogawa found that the presence of deoxygenated hemoglobin in blood 
vessels caused magnetic susceptibility effects that could be imaged.45 
He verified his findings, which were referred to as blood-oxygenation-
level dependent (BOLD) contrast,46 in a second experiment in which 
an MRI scanner was used to image tubes filled with oxygenated and 
deoxygenated blood. The second experiment confirmed Ogawa's ear-
lier conclusion that the presence of deoxygenated blood changes the 
magnetic resonance signal relative to the presence of oxygenated 
blood.47 Attempting to verify in a third experiment that BOLD con-
trast resulted from the metabolic demand for oxygen, Ogawa 
changed the gases inhaled by anesthetized rats while measuring 
BOLD contrast at a high magnetic field.48 This experiment confirmed 
that BOLD contrast depends on the metabolic demand for oxygen.49 
 Although Ogawa found in his three initial experiments that MRI 
could be used to measure changes in blood oxygenation, scientists 
still needed to demonstrate that MRI could be used to identify the 
parts of the human brain that were responsible for different func-
                                                                                                                    
 40. Keith R. Thulborn et al., Oxygenation Dependence of the Transverse Relaxation 
Time of Water Protons in Whole Blood at High Field, 714 BIOCHIMICA ET BIOPHYSICA ACTA 
265, 265 (1982). 
 41. Peter Jezzard & Richard B. Buxton, The Clinical Potential of Functional Magnetic 
Resonance Imaging, 23 J. MAGNETIC RESONANCE IMAGING 787, 788 (2006). 
 42. HUETTEL ET AL., supra note 22, at 160. 
 43. Raichle, supra note 36, at 3. 
 44. HUETTEL ET AL., supra note 22, at 160-61.  
 45. Seiji Ogawa et al., Oxygenation-Sensitive Contrast in Magnetic Resonance Image 
of Rodent Brain at High Magnetic Fields, 14 MAGNETIC RESONANCE MED. 68, 68 (1990). 
 46. See, e.g., Nikos K. Logothetis, The Underpinnings of the BOLD Functional Mag-
netic Resonance Imaging Signal, 23 J. NEUROSCIENCE 3963, 3963 (2003) 
 47. Seiji Ogawa & Tso-Ming Lee, Magnetic Resonance Imaging of Blood Vessels at 
High Fields: In Vivo and in Vitro Measurements and Image Simulation, 16 MAGNETIC 
RESONANCE MED. 9, 9 (1990). 
 48. S. Ogawa et al., Brain Magnetic Resonance Imaging with Contrast Dependent on 
Blood Oxygenation, 87 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 9868, 9868 (1990). 
 49. Id. 
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tions.50 Three groups of scientists published BOLD fMRI studies in-
volving human subjects in 1992. In the first study, Kenneth Kwong 
used a 1.5-Tesla magnetic field to scan the brains of individuals as 
they alternated between watching a flashing pattern and watching 
nothing. Kwong found significant activity in the subjects’ visual cor-
tex that lasted while the pattern flashed, but receded when nothing 
was shown.51 In the second study, Ogawa replicated the findings of 
Kwong using a higher (4-Tesla) magnetic field.52 In a third study, Pe-
ter Bandettini scanned the brains of research subjects using a 1.5-
Tesla magnetic field while the subjects repeatedly touched their fin-
gers to their thumbs.53 Bandettini found significant activity in the 
subjects’ primary motor cortex.54 Although the identification of the 
parts of the brain responsible for visual and sensorimotor functions 
had been known since the end of the nineteenth century, the studies 
of Kwong, Ogawa, and Bandettini replicated earlier findings, thus 
paving the way for fMRI to be used to study other brain functions. 
 Today, fMRI is considered a powerful method of imaging human 
brain function.55 In a typical fMRI experiment, subjects are assigned 
one or more control and experimental tasks, and their brains are 
scanned during the performance of such tasks.56 Functional MRI cap-
tures in images the different BOLD contrasts that result from the 
control and experimental tasks.57 By subtracting the control images 
from the experimental images, maps of the brain showing the areas 
to which a surplus of oxygenated blood flowed in response to the per-
formance of the experimental tasks can be created.58 
                                                                                                                    
 50. HUETTEL ET AL., supra note 22, at 171. 
 51. Kenneth K. Kwong et al., Dynamic Magnetic Resonance Imaging of Human Brain 
Activity During Primary Sensory Stimulation, 89 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 5675, 5675 
(1992). 
 52. Seiji Ogawa et al., Intrinsic Signal Changes Accompanying Sensory Stimulation: 
Functional Brain Mapping with Magnetic Resonance Imaging, 89 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 
5951, 5951 (1992).  
 53. Peter A. Bandettini et al., Time Course EPI of Human Brain Function During 
Task Activation, 25 MAGNETIC RESONANCE MED. 390, 391 (1992). 
 54. Id. at 392. 
 55. See, e.g., Judy Illes et al., Ethical and Practical Considerations in Managing Inci-
dental Findings in Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging, 3 BRAIN & COGNITION 358, 
358 (2002); Judy Illes, Ethical Issues at the Intersection of Imaging and Genomics, presen-
tation at the Princeton University Symposium: Politics of Biomedical Research: Issues, In-
formation and Policy Decision-Making (Mar. 28, 2003). 
 56. Judy Illes & Eric Racine, Imaging or Imagining? A Neuroethics Challenge In-
formed by Genetics, AM. J. BIOETHICS,  Mar.-Apr. 2005, at 5, 7. 
 57. See id. 
 58. Id.; Jeffrey R. Binder & Stephen M. Rao, Human Brain Mapping with Functional 
Magnetic Resonance Imaging, in LOCALIZATION AND NEUROIMAGING IN NEUROPSYCHOLOGY 
185, 193 (Andrew Kertesz ed., 1994); Donald Kennedy, Neuroimaging: Revolutionary Re-
search Tool or a Post-Modern Phrenology? AM. J. BIOETHICS, Mar.-Apr. 2005, at 19, 19.  
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III.   FMRI APPLICATIONS 
A.   Clinical Applications 
 Functional MRI has a number of current and potential clinical, 
scientific, and social applications.59 Preneurosurgical brain mapping, 
an early application,60 was made possible by scientists who evaluated 
batteries of pre-operative fMRI tasks in order to identify the areas of 
the brain that are associated with tactile, motor, language, and vis-
ual functions.61 The brain maps produced by fMRI have helped neu-
rosurgeons assess surgical risk, plan surgical routes, and direct in-
traoperative electrophysiological procedures.62 As one among many 
possible examples, a research team based out of Washington Univer-
sity in St. Louis used fMRI in 2003 to help them pinpoint the un-
usual location of language centers in a patient with a long history of 
severe epileptic seizures.63 Knowledge of the precise location of the 
language centers was critical to the patient’s successful surgical out-
come.64  
 Scientists continue to study how fMRI can be used to improve 
neurosurgery65 as well as deep brain stimulation for treatment of 
Parkinson’s disease66 and depression.67 Medical center press releases 
not infrequently advertise the ways in which fMRI can help to map 
functional areas of the brain and preserve brain function.68 News re-
porters also have recognized fMRI’s clinical potential, although they 
seem to be one step ahead of the scientists: “At this rate, it seems 
that neuroscientists will soon pinpoint the regions in the brain where 
                                                                                                                    
 59. See generally Symposium, Clinical Potential of Brain Mapping Using MRI, 23 J. 
MAGNETIC RESONANCE IMAGING 785 (2006). 
 60. See Jezzard & Buxton, supra note 41, at 790. 
 61. Joy Hirsch et al., An Integrated Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging Proce-
dure for Preoperative Mapping of Cortical Areas Associated with Tactile, Motor, Language, 
and Visual Functions, 47 NEUROSURGERY 711, 711 (2000). 
 62. Id. at 711, 718-20. 
 63. M.V. Baciu et al., Functional MRI Reveals an Interhemispheric Dissociation of 
Frontal and Temporal Language Regions in a Patient with Focal Epilepsy, 4 EPILEPSY & 
BEHAV. 776, 776 (2003). 
 64. Id. at 777-79.  
 65. Paul E. Kim & Manbir Singh, Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging for Brain 
Mapping in Neurosurgery, 15 NEUROSURGICAL FOCUS 1, 1 (2003). 
 66. Andres Lozano, Deep Brain Stimulation: Challenges to Integrating Stimulation 
Technology with Human Neurobiology, Neuroplasticity, and Neural Repair, 38 J. 
REHABILITATION RES. & DEV. x, xi, xvii (2001). 
 67. David Dobbs, A Depression Switch?, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 2, 2006, § 6, at 50.  
 68. Gerry Everding, Better Brain Imaging Helps Surgeons Avoid Damage to Language 
Functions, WASHINGTON U. ST. LOUIS NEWS & INFO., Nov. 4, 2003, 
http://mednews.wustl.edu/tips/page/normal/494.html (last visited June 22, 2007); Func-
tional MRI Used in Brain Activity Mapping for Surgical Planning, U. IOWA DEP’T 
RADIOLOGY NEWS, June 20, 2001, http://www.radiology.uiowa.edu/news/mri-surg.html.  
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mediocre poetry is generated, where high school grudges are lodged, 
where sarcasm blooms like a red rose.”69 
B.   Understanding Racial Evaluation 
 Functional MRI also has a number of study applications. Socio-
logical research over the last several decades has showed that self-
reports of prejudicial attitudes towards individuals of other racial 
groups have declined70 and that fewer White Americans express 
negative attitudes towards Black Americans now than forty years 
ago.71 Notwithstanding these findings, scientists continue to observe 
negative evaluations of individuals of different racial groups in stud-
ies that bypass access to conscious awareness and control.72 One of 
the goals of the field of social cognition is to understand the nature of 
these unconscious evaluations,73 and scientists believe that fMRI 
may be helpful in this regard.74 
 The response of the amygdala—a small, almond-shaped structure 
in the medial temporal lobe that is best known for its role in emo-
tional learning and memory—to photographs of individuals of differ-
ent racial groups was first studied by Allen Hart and his colleagues 
in 2000.75 The scientists used fMRI to acquire images while eight 
healthy subjects between twenty and thirty-five years of age who had 
identified themselves as Black or White were presented with sixty 
grayscale photographs of Black and White faces.76 During the later 
stimulus presentations, the scientists observed significantly greater 
BOLD signal in the amygdala in response to outgroup (individuals of 
a different race) versus ingroup (individuals of their own race) 
faces.77 The scientists concluded that amygdala responses to human 
face stimuli must be affected by the relationship between the per-
ceived race of the stimulus face and that of the subject.78 Although 
their data “provide[d] a foundation for future related studies in the 
neuroscience of social cognition and race,”79 the scientists cautioned 
                                                                                                                    
 69. Benedict Carey, Searching for the Person in the Brain, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 5, 2006, § 
4, at 41. 
 70. Elizabeth A. Phelps et al., Performance on Indirect Measures of Race Evaluation 
Predicts Amygdala Activation, 12 J. COGNITIVE NEUROSCIENCE 729, 729 (2000). 
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against drawing premature conclusions, emphasizing the lack of 
BOLD signal difference observed during initial (as opposed to later) 
stimulus presentations.80 
 Elizabeth Phelps and her colleagues conducted a second study in 
2000 that “used fMRI to explore the neural substrates involved in the 
unconscious evaluation of Black and White social groups.”81 In her 
first experiment, Phelps used fMRI to acquire images while present-
ing White American subjects with pictures of unfamiliar Black and 
White male faces with neutral facial expressions.82 Phelps found that 
“variability in amygdala activation among White subjects is corre-
lated with negative indirect responses to Black compared to White 
faces on behavioral measures.”83 This finding led Phelps to her now 
famous conclusion “that representations of social groups that differ 
in race evoke differential amygdala activity and that such activation 
is related to unconscious social evaluation.” 84 Phelps found the activ-
ity in the left-superior amygdala significant in light of findings that 
that region is activated when fearful (versus neutral) facial expres-
sions are presented.85 
 Phelps also had hypothesized that any amygdala activity that was 
observed during the first experiment would disappear if she showed 
her subjects “exemplars of Black Americans who are as familiar and 
well liked as White Americans.”86 To test this hypothesis, Phelps 
conducted a second experiment in which she presented to her sub-
jects pictures of famous and positively regarded Black individuals, 
including Martin Luther King, Jr., Michael Jordan, and Will Smith.87 
Phelps observed “no consistent pattern of amygdala activity” in her 
second experiment.88 The results of both experiments suggest that 
the amygdala may be specifically involved in indirect or unconscious 
responses to racial groups and that amygdala response “is a function 
of culturally acquired information about social groups, modified by 
individual knowledge and experience.”89 Phelps concluded by noting 
that she had, “for the first time, related indirect behavioral measures 
                                                                                                                    
 80. Id. at 2353-54. 
 81. Phelps et al., supra note 70, at 729. 
 82. Id. at 730. 
 83. Id. at 733. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. at 736. 
 88. Id. at 733. 
 89. Id. at 734. 
426  FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34:000 
 
of social evaluation to neuronal activity.”90 Investigators continue to 
build on the initial work of Hart, Phelps, and their colleagues.91 
 Following the publication of Phelps’ research, some speculated 
that advances in functional neuroimaging technology could be used 
to reveal individuals’ racial preferences and even prejudices.92 Radio 
and news reports carried headlines such as Racial Bias on the 
Brain,93 Inside the Mind of a Racist: Scans May Reveal Brain’s Hid-
den Centres of Prejudice,94 and Hiding Racial Bias Can Tax Brain.95 
Perhaps in response to headlines such as these, Phelps issued a 
statement expressly warning against using fMRI to detect racism: 
“The measures used in this research should not and cannot be as-
sumed to be a battery of tests that can be used to reveal an individ-
ual's hidden racism. It would be improper to use them in any selec-
tion or diagnostic context.”96 Phelps also argued that “we should not 
label someone ‘racist’ because of the pattern of his or her brain re-
sponse”97 and that brain science should not yet be used to guide social 
and political choices.98 
C.   Detecting Deception 
 According to the federal Office of Technology Assessment, poly-
graph—which relies on skin conductance, heart rate, and respira-
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tion—“is currently the most widely used method for detection of de-
ception.”99 Because of the difficulty associated with admitting poly-
graph results into courtroom evidence due to the technology’s unreli-
ability, the search has been on for a new and better method of lie de-
tection.100 In a study published in 2001, Sean Spence and his col-
leagues used fMRI to scan the brains of ten male subjects as they an-
swered thirty-six questions including, “Have you made your bed to-
day?” and “Have you taken a tablet today?”101 Finding that reaction 
times were significantly longer when the subjects were lying and that 
“there was reliable activation within specific regions of prefrontal 
cortex,”102 the study authors concluded that “by using a highly con-
strained behavioural protocol we may begin to delineate the cognitive 
components of deception in human subjects. fMRI may provide a fea-
sible method for investigating their neural correlates.”103 
 Daniel Langleben and his colleagues also used fMRI to examine 
the neural correlates of deception in 2001.104 In their oft-cited study, 
the authors’ subjects held a 5-of-clubs playing card in their pocket 
and were told to deny that they held the card while their brains were 
being scanned.105 After reviewing the resulting brain scans, the scien-
tists concluded that “there is a neurophysiological difference between 
deception and truth at the brain activation level that can be detected 
with fMRI” and that “refinements of the paradigm design and image 
analysis methodology could . . . establish an activation pattern pre-
dictive of deception on an individual level.”106  
 In a third study conducted in 2001, Tatia Lee and her colleagues 
hypothesized that the pattern of brain activation in malingerers—
individuals who intentionally and falsely or fraudulently simulate or 
exaggerate physical or mental disease—“would provide unique 
markers for the detection of deception.”107 Lee used fMRI to image 
the brain activations of six healthy male volunteers while they per-
formed forced-choice memory tasks involving simulated malinger-
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ing.108 Lee found some initial evidence of the neural correlates of 
feigned memory impairment and concluded that she may have iden-
tified “some extremely significant preliminary markers that have the 
promise to enhance the development of valid and sensitive methods 
for the detection of malingering.”109 Lee stated that future studies 
should attempt to distinguish different types of liars.110  
 Other scientists have built on the initial work of Spence, Langle-
ben, Lee, and their colleagues.111 In one among several recent studies, 
Christos Davatzikos and his colleagues used fMRI to correctly iden-
tify 99 percent of true and false responses, leading to their conclusion 
that “accurate clinical tests could be based on measurements of brain 
function with fMRI.”112 In a second recent study, Langleben and his 
colleagues concluded that “fMRI, in conjunction with a carefully con-
trolled query procedure, could be used to detect deception in individ-
ual subjects.”113 Following the publication of these studies, the media 
issued dozens of reports stating that fMRI is capable of accurate lie 
detection. BBC News’ headline—Brain Scanner Is a Lie Detector—
was perhaps the most convincing.114 Others were strongly emphatic: 
Don’t Even Think About Lying: How Brain Scans Are Reinventing the 
Science of Lie Detection115 and Are They Lying? Functional MRI 
Holds the Answer, Scientists Say.116 
 Reports of government interest in fMRI have fueled speculation 
over the government’s desired use of the technology. For example, 
the Department of Homeland Security granted $3.5 million to Lock-
heed Martin and Rutgers University to develop a lie detector,117 the 
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Department of Defense Polygraph Institute requested funding pro-
posals investigating lie detection,118 and the Department of Defense 
Advanced Research Projects Agency is developing a “head web,” or a 
helmet that would conduct noninvasive brain monitoring of soldiers 
while in combat.119 Now, the question is whether government and 
criminal justice officials will attempt to use fMRI to determine 
whether criminal suspects and terrorists are engaging in decep-
tion.120 Bioethicists, lawyers, and physicians have contributed to the 
speculation.121 
 Drawing the line between science and speculation is difficult in 
the context of fMRI lie detection because two companies—No Lie 
MRI, Inc. and Cephos Corp.—already have websites that identify a 
range of potential brain scanning uses.122 According to its website, No 
Lie MRI is currently marketing its brain scanning services to federal, 
state, and international governments, as well as a range of private 
companies.123 Cephos Corporation stated in late December 2006 its 
intention to offer its brain scanning product as soon as its product 
meets its own internally established scientific standards.124 Robert 
Shapiro, who is best known for defending O.J. Simpson in his double-
murder case (and who has a financial interest in Cephos), says that 
he will use fMRI “ ‘tomorrow in virtually every criminal and civil 
case on my desk’ to check the truthfulness of clients.”125 Perhaps in 
response to reports such as these, Langleben co-authored a paper in 
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2005 that stated, “Premature application of these technologies out-
side of research settings should be resisted, and the social conversa-
tion about the appropriate parameters of its civil, forensic, and secu-
rity use should begin.”126 However, the website of Langleben’s No Lie 
MRI continues to advertise its brain scanning product for these 
uses.127 
D.   Understanding Social Cooperation and Altruism 
 For many years, evolutionary biologists, behaviorists, economists, 
and even political scientists have attempted to understand why coop-
eration (the act of working together to achieve a common aim) and 
altruism (the belief that acting for the benefit of others is right and 
good) exist, even though these acts and beliefs may not result in any 
direct or immediate reward to the cooperative or altruistic individ-
ual.128 During the last decade, scientists have used fMRI in an at-
tempt to better understand cooperative and altruistic behavior. 
 In one study involving two separate experiments conducted in 
2002, James Rilling and his colleagues scanned the brains of thirty-
six women as they played the Prisoner’s Dilemma, a game in which 
two players independently choose whether to cooperate with each 
other or betray each other for immediate gain.129 The study authors 
concluded that mutual cooperation was associated with consistent 
activation in regions of the brain linked to reward processing.130 The 
scientists proposed that the pattern of neural activation positively re-
inforces reciprocal altruism, thereby motivating subjects to resist the 
temptation to act in their immediate self-interest by defecting.131 
 In a second study conducted in 2004, Rilling and his colleagues 
hypothesized “that reciprocated cooperation will increase the firing 
frequency of midbrain dopamine neurons, whereas unreciprocated 
cooperation will decrease the firing frequency.”132 The purpose of the 
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study was to better understand the neural mechanism that allows 
individuals to learn who is a good social partner and who is not, 
thereby protecting individuals from partnering with cheaters.133 The 
scientists scanned the brains of nineteen subjects while they played a 
series of single-shot Prisoner’s Dilemma games and found that recip-
rocated cooperation was associated with an increased BOLD re-
sponse and that an unreciprocated cooperation was associated with a 
decreased BOLD response.134 The scientists believe that the differ-
ence in BOLD response may teach individuals to partner with other 
individuals who reciprocate and to avoid individuals who do not re-
ciprocate.135 
 Following the publication of Rilling’s first study in 2002, a New 
York Times reporter quoted one of Rilling’s colleagues as stating, “ ‘If 
we put some C.E.O.’s in [an fMRI scanner], I’d like to see how they 
respond. . . . Maybe they wouldn’t find a positive social interaction 
rewarding at all.’ ”136 Perhaps prominent bioethicist Jonathan Mo-
reno read the Times article; he speculated in 2003 that employers 
might want to use fMRI to recruit applicants for employment who 
experience more or less pleasure from cooperation, depending on the 
requirements of the job.137 
E.   Understanding Sexual Arousal and Love 
 Functional MRI also has been used to study the neural correlates 
of sexual arousal as well as maternal and romantic love. Notwith-
standing the common understanding of the brain as the “master or-
gan” that governs sexual function, little has been known about the 
neural correlates of sexual arousal.138 In an attempt to better under-
stand this relationship, Bruce Arnow and his colleagues conducted a 
study in 2000 that used fMRI to examine the brains of fourteen het-
erosexual males aged eighteen to thirty years as they watched erotic, 
relaxing, and sports video material.139 “[T]he erotic segments in-
volved four types of sexual activities: rear entry intercourse, inter-
course with the female in the superior position, fellatio and sexual 
intercourse with the male in the superior position.”140 A custom-built 
pneumatic pressure cuff was used to measure the subjects’ penile 
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turgidity while their brains were being scanned.141 The study authors 
observed strong brain activations associated with penile turgidity in 
the right insula/subinsular region of the subjects’ brains and smaller, 
but still significant, activations in the subjects’ hypothalamuses.142 
Although they clarified that they could not draw any “causal conclu-
sions regarding brain-behavior relationships” from their study, the 
scientists did state that their findings suggest “which regions of the 
brain, if damaged, might produce changes in sexual function.”143 The 
scientists hinted that future studies involving brain-damaged sub-
jects might provide more information about “the precise roles of acti-
vated regions in sexual arousal.”144 
 Although romantic and maternal love are regarded as highly re-
warding experiences and “are linked to the perpetuation of the spe-
cies,” very little has been known about their neural correlates.145 In 
an attempt to better understand the neural correlates of romantic 
love, Andreas Bartels and Semir Zeki in 2000 used fMRI to image the 
brains of eleven female and six male volunteers who claimed to be “ 
‘truly, deeply and madly in love’ ” while they viewed images of the ob-
jects of their affections.146 The scientists compared this brain activity 
to the activity that resulted when the volunteers viewed control im-
ages of “three friends of the same sex as their loved partner.”147 The 
scientists concluded from their findings that a unique network of ar-
eas are associated with romantic love.148 
 In an attempt to better understand the neural correlates of ma-
ternal love, Bartels and Zeki conducted a second study in 2003 that 
used fMRI to measure brain activity in twenty mothers aged twenty-
seven to forty-nine while they viewed pictures of their own children 
as well as control images of other children.149 The scientists then 
compared the maternal brain activations to those associated with 
romantic love from their 2000 study, finding that both types of at-
tachment activated areas of the brain specific to each, as well as 
overlapping areas in the brain’s reward system that coincide with ar-
eas rich in oxytocin and vasopressin receptors.150 The scientists also 
found that both romantic and maternal love deactivated a common 
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set of regions associated with negative emotions, social judgment, 
and the assessment of other people’s intentions and emotions.151 The 
scientists concluded that human attachment bonds individuals 
through a “push-pull mechanism’ that deactivates networks used for 
critical social assessment and negative emotions while triggering 
mechanisms involved in reward.152 Picking up on both the romantic 
and maternal love studies, the media has reported that Science 
Unlocks Secrets of the Elixir of Love153 and Love Makes You Light 
Up—Even in Your Brain, Researchers Say.154 
 Scientists continue to study the neural correlates of love and sex-
ual arousal,155 as well as sexual preferences. In a study published in 
2006, Felicitas Kranz and Alumit Ishai hypothesized that heterosex-
ual and homosexual subjects would exhibit a greater response in the 
reward circuitry to faces deemed sexually preferable.156 To test their 
hypothesis, the study authors used fMRI to scan the brains of forty 
subjects—ten heterosexual women, ten heterosexual men, ten homo-
sexual women, and ten homosexual men—as they viewed faces of in-
dividuals of different genders.157  
 Consistent with their hypothesis, the authors found that the gen-
der of a viewed individual, when the sexual preference of the subject 
was taken into account, did make a difference in the reactions seen 
in the thalamus and the orbitofrontal cortex, a region of the brain’s 
reward circuitry.158 Heterosexual women and homosexual men exhib-
ited a significantly greater response to male faces, whereas hetero-
sexual men and homosexual women responded significantly more to 
female faces.159 The scientists concluded that the brain's response to 
faces in the reward circuitry is modulated by sexual preference and 
that there is neural evidence for the role of face processing in mat-
ing.160  
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 Following publication of Kranz’s and Ishai’s study, news maga-
zines and blogs reported that Gays Read Faces Differently than 
Straights161 and Gay Brains Respond Differently to Faces than 
Straight Brains.162 These headlines add to prior speculation that the 
government and other organizations might want to use fMRI to test 
soldiers and members for homosexuality or unconscious sexual im-
pulses and to discharge such individuals based upon “positive” test 
results.163 
F.   Understanding Ethical Decision Making 
 Functional MRI also has been used to study the neural correlates 
of ethical decision making, including the decisions required by the 
classic, two-scenario trolley problem. In the trolley problem, a run-
away train is approaching five people on a track.164 In the first sce-
nario, all five people on the track will die unless an individual pulls a 
lever that will move the train onto a second track, on which a sole 
person is standing.165 If the individual pulls the lever and diverts the 
train onto the second track, the person on the second track will be 
killed but the five people will be saved.166 The question is, what 
should the individual do and why? Most people would say that the 
individual ought to pull the lever and save five lives at the expense of 
one.167 In the second scenario, an individual is standing on a foot-
bridge overlooking the same track.168 Right next to the individual on 
the footbridge is a man who is overweight.169 If the individual pushes 
the man onto the track, the individual will stop the train and save 
five people, although the man who is overweight will be killed.170 
Again, the question is, what should the individual do and why? 
 Many people believe that it is morally acceptable to pull the lever 
in the first scenario, but not to push the man who is overweight to 
his death in the second scenario. Although the logic in both cases is 
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the same, some have described the difference as the emotional close-
ness, or the “up close and personal” nature, of the second action com-
pared to the relative distancing of the first.171 Stated another way, 
the thought of directly pushing someone to his death may be more 
“emotionally salient” than the thought of hitting a switch that will 
cause a trolley to produce similar consequences.172 
 Joshua Greene and his colleagues decided to test this hypothesis 
using fMRI in 2001.173 Greene found that, when confronted by the 
second scenario, his subjects’ fMRI scans showed activation in areas 
associated with the emotions of sadness, fright or general uneasi-
ness—areas that were not activated by the first scenario.174 Although 
Greene concluded that the emotional response was the crucial differ-
ence between the two scenarios, he emphasized in his published 
study that his conclusion was descriptive, rather than prescriptive, 
and that he was not claiming to have shown that any actions or 
judgments were morally right or wrong.175 However, several news re-
ports announced Greene’s research findings using headlines such as 
Cerebral Scans for Right and Wrong and Brain Imaging Sheds Light 
on Moral Decision-Making.176 Scientists continue to use fMRI to 
study the areas of the brain that are activated during ethical and 
moral decision making.177 
G.   Neuromarketing 
 Functional MRI also has been used to examine preferences re-
garding consumer goods and services such as automobiles,178 soft 
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drinks,179 campaign advertisements,180 and the content of movie trail-
ers181—in part to help manufacturers and marketing companies de-
termine the best way to market certain products and services. In one 
study sponsored by DaimlerChrysler in 2002, Susanne Erk and her 
colleagues used fMRI to study the rewarding properties of cars that 
signaled wealth and social dominance.182 Erk hypothesized that 
sports cars—in contrast to other cars such as small cars and even 
limousines—would activate the reward circuitry in the brain.183 To 
test her hypothesis, Erk asked twelve healthy male subjects to view 
different classes of cars while having their brains scanned.184 Erk ob-
served significantly more activation in reward-related areas of the 
brain for sports cars in contrast to other categories of cars, thus lead-
ing to her conclusion that “artificial cultural objects associated with 
wealth and social dominance elicit activation in reward-related brain 
areas.”185 
 In a second neuromarketing study, Samuel McClure and his col-
leagues used fMRI to examine the neural correlates underlying soft-
drink preferences and their influence by cultural images.186 When 
brain images were acquired during the subjects’ blind taste-test of 
Coke and Pepsi, McClure found activity in an area of the brain that 
is “implicated in signaling basic appetitive aspects of reward.”187 
When brain images were acquired when the subjects were told that 
they were drinking Coke, areas of the brain known to be “implicated 
in modifying behavior based on emotion and affect” were activated.188 
When brain images were acquired when the subjects were told that 
they were drinking Pepsi, the same activations were not observed.189 
McClure concluded that brand knowledge of Coke dramatically influ-
enced certain brain activations.190 
 In a third neuromarketing study conducted at UCLA in 2004, sci-
entists used fMRI to study the brain reaction of known Republican 
and Democrat voters who were shown campaign advertisements that 
included images of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks.191 The 
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UCLA scientists found that the campaign advertisements caused the 
amygdala—an area of the brain known to be associated with fear and 
anger—to light up more vividly in Democrats than in Republicans.192 
Although the scientists warned against drawing conclusions about 
the ability of fMRI to help with political campaigns until they had 
experimented with a greater number of subjects, news reports refer-
enced the study when speculating that fMRI will help candidates rely 
less on campaign clichés and more on “scientific” advertising.193 
 In addition to automobiles, soft drinks, and campaign and product 
advertisements,194 fMRI also has been used to study the marketabil-
ity of movie trailers and beautiful female faces.195 Companies on both 
sides of the Atlantic—the Brighthouse Institute for Thought Sciences 
in Atlanta, FKF Applied Research in Los Angeles, and the UK’s Neu-
rosense/Neuromarketing Consultancy—have claimed they can use 
fMRI and the principles of cognitive neuroscience to gain insight into 
human behaviour.196 Not surprisingly, the media has picked up on 
fMRI’s neuromarketing potential to ask whether the brain has a “buy 
button,” to discuss the “science of shopping” and the “why of buy,” 
and to “probe the minds of consumers.”197 
H.   Other fMRI Studies 
 This Part presents a few popular fMRI studies that have gener-
ated significant speculation regarding their application in non-
research contexts. Functional MRI also has been used to study the 
neural correlates of stroke,198 multiple sclerosis,199 Parkinson’s dis-
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ease,200 Alzheimer’s disease,201 major depression,202 schizophrenia,203 
bipolar disorder,204 obsessive-compulsive disorder,205 dyslexia and hy-
perlexia,206 attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder,207 pedophilia,208 
cocaine addiction,209 compulsive gambling,210 expected and unex-
pected pleasure,211 satiety and obesity,212 anxiety,213 neuroticism,214 
extraversion,215 self-consciousness,216 physical pain,217 migraines and 
cluster headaches,218 social rejection,219 intelligence,220 humanity,221 
                                                                                                                    
 200. Id. at 845. 
 201. Alexandra Golby et al., Memory Encoding in Alzheimer’s Disease: An fMRI Study 
of Explicit and Implicit Memory, 128 BRAIN 773, 773 (2005). 
 202. Avram J. Holmes et al., Prefrontal Functioning During Context Processing in 
Schizophrenia and Major Depression: An Event-Related fMRI Study, 76 SCHIZOPHRENIA 
RES. 199, 199 (2005); Dobbs, supra note 67. 
 203. Cherine Fahim et al., Brain Activity During Emotionally Negative Pictures in 
Schizophrenia With and Without Flat Effect: An fMRI Study, 140 PSYCHIATRY RES.: 
NEUROIMAGING 1, 1 (2005); Rachel L.C. Mitchell et al., Neural Response to Emotional 
Prosody in Schizophrenia and in Bipolar Affective Disorder, 184 BRIT. J. PSYCHIATRY 223, 
223 (2004). 
 204. Mitchell et al., supra note 203, at 223. 
 205. Martina T. Mitterschiffthaler et al., Applications of Functional Magnetic Reso-
nance Imaging in Psychiatry, 23 J. MAGNETIC RESONANCE IMAGING 851, 854 (2006). 
 206. Serge Ruff et al., Neural Substrates of Impaired Categorical Perception of Pho-
nemes in Adult Dyslexics: An fMRI Study, 53 BRAIN & COGNITION 331, 331 (2003); Peter E. 
Turkeltaub et al., The Neural Basis of Hyperlexic Reading: An fMRI Case Study, 41 
NEURON 11, 11 (2004); Gina Kolata, Scientists Track the Process of Reading Through the 
Brain, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 3, 1998, at F3. 
 207. George Bush et al., Functional Neuroimaging of Attention-Deficit/Hyperactivity 
Disorder: A Review and Suggested Future Directions, 57 BIOLOGICAL PSYCHIATRY 1273, 
1273 (2005). 
 208. Harald Dressing et al., Homosexual Pedophilia and Functional Networks—An 
fMRI Case Report and Literature Review, 69 FORTSCHRITTE DER NEUROLOGIE-PSYCHIATRIE 
539, 539 (2001). 
 209. Hans C. Breiter et al., Acute Effects of Cocaine on Human Brain Activity and 
Emotion, 19 NEURON 591, 591 (1997); Precise Effects of Cocaine Are Seen in Brain Scans, 
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 26, 1997, at A18. 
 210. David N. Crockford et al., Cue-Induced Brain Activity in Pathological Gamblers, 
58 BIOLOGICAL PSYCHIATRY 787, 787 (2005).  
 211. Gregory S. Berns et al., Predictability Modulates Human Brain Response to Re-
ward, 21 J. NEUROSCIENCE 2793, 2793 (2001); Eric Nagourney, Surprise! Brain Likes 
Thrill of Unknown, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 17, 2001, at F6. 
 212. G. Andrew James et al., Imaging In Vivo Brain-Hormone Interaction in the Con-
trol of Eating and Obesity, 3 DIABETES TECH. & THERAPEUTICS 617, 617 (2001). 
 213. Ahmad R. Hariri et al., Serotonin Transporter Genetic Variation and the Response 
of the Human Amygdala, 297 SCI. 400, 400 (2002); Eric Nagourney, Fearing More than 
Fear Itself, N.Y. TIMES, July 30, 2002, at F6. 
 214. Naomi I. Eisenberger et al., Personality from a Controlled Processing Perspective: 
An fMRI Study of Neuroticism, Extraversion, and Self-Consciousness, 5 COGNITIVE, 
AFFECTIVE, & BEHAV. NEUROSCIENCE 169, 169 (2005). 
 215. Id. 
 216. Id. 
 217. Alexander Ploghaus et al., Dissociating Pain from Its Anticipation in the Human 
Brain, 284 SCI. 1979, 1979 (1999); Melanie Thernstrom, My Pain, My Brain, N.Y. TIMES, 
May 14, 2006, § 6, at 50. 
 218. Weiller et al., supra note 198, at 846. 
2006]                          NEURO EXCEPTIONALISM? 439 
 
empathy (or lack thereof),222 trust,223 humor,224 recognition of 
beauty225 and, even, the differences in the way men’s and women’s 
brains function when they are thinking.226 Approximately 10,000 
fMRI studies have been conducted since the technology’s introduction 
in the early 1990s.227  
I.   fMRI Hype 
 This Part shows that although many of the scientists who conduct 
neuroimaging studies use care when publishing their findings—and 
even caution readers against inappropriate or too eager interpreta-
tions and applications—the descriptions of neuroimaging research in 
the popular media (including physicians’, lawyers’, bioethicists’, and 
scientists’ statements to the media) are not as constrained.228 The 
public must wade through reports suggesting that fMRI is (or soon 
will be) capable of completely transforming neurosurgical interven-
tions, identifying individuals’ racial preferences and prejudices, de-
termining deception on an individual level, selecting socially coopera-
tive or competitive individuals from among a pool of applicants, and 
recognizing whether an individual is heterosexual or homosexual, 
capable of making moral and ethical decisions, or prefers a particular 
consumer product. The public is increasingly confronted with reports 
that racial evaluation, deception, maternal and romantic love, vio-
lence, and mental disorders are “hardwired” in the brain, despite sci-
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entists’ published statements that their research simply examines 
the neural correlates of such conditions and behaviors.229 Notwith-
standing many scientists’ attempts to clarify their research findings 
and identify appropriate and inappropriate uses of fMRI, the pub-
lic—as well as employers, insurers, educators, marketing companies, 
judges, criminal justice officials, and government officials—still may 
be confused regarding what is science and what is speculation.230  
 Add to this confusion the pressures faced by individuals and or-
ganizations to obtain information that will optimize decision making. 
Neurosurgeons are under pressure to preserve brain function during 
surgery. Psychiatrists are under pressure to distinguish individuals 
who have schizophrenia from individuals who have bipolar disorder, 
because these two groups of individuals may respond to different 
treatments.231 Health and life insurers are under pressure to under-
write only the healthiest individuals. Employers are under pressure 
to hire only the most productive applicants. Educational institutions 
are under pressure to admit only the most qualified students, and 
marketing companies are under pressure to advertise their clients’ 
products in the most cost-efficient manner. Judges want to convict 
only those individuals who have actually committed crimes, criminal 
justice officials want to reduce jail and prison overcrowding by free-
ing those individuals who will behave appropriately during proba-
tion, and government officials want to identify which individuals will 
commit terrorist acts to prevent another September 11. Viewed in 
light of these pressures, the extensive speculation regarding fMRI’s 
nonresearch applications is better understood. 
 Because of the potential for functional neuroimaging information 
to be used in nonresearch contexts, scientists need to continue the 
care with which they describe their research findings and the dili-
gence with which they identify appropriate and inappropriate uses of 
neuroimaging information.232 Private and governmental organiza-
tions that are legally permitted233 to conduct fMRI tests or obtain 
neuroimaging test results should first consult with scientists who 
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conduct functional neuroimaging studies to ensure that they under-
stand the limitations of neuroimaging research and the meaning of 
fMRI test results.234 And, because functional neuroimaging informa-
tion can be sensitive and stigmatizing, individuals who create, ob-
tain, or use such information must protect its confidentiality and re-
spect the privacy and identity of the individuals to whom the infor-
mation relates. 
J.   Definitions 
 With this background, I now turn to fMRI’s confidentiality, pri-
vacy, and identity implications,235 although I first must define confi-
dentiality, privacy, and identity. The literature contains no shortage 
of relevant definitions (or lack of understanding thereof).236 Yet an-
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other attempt to define these terms will not meaningfully add to this 
literature. Accordingly, I use the word confidentiality to mean the ob-
ligation of an individual or organization to prevent the unauthorized 
or otherwise inappropriate use or disclosure of appropriately gath-
ered functional neuroimaging information.237 Confidentiality issues 
raised by fMRI include the appropriateness of various uses and dis-
closures of functional neuroimaging information by physicians, scien-
tists, hospitals, imaging centers, and academic medical centers. 
 I use the word privacy more broadly to include an individual’s in-
terest in avoiding the unwanted collection of her functional neuroi-
maging information by a third party.238 Relevant privacy issues in-
clude an individual’s interest in preventing health care providers, 
scientists, insurance companies, employers, educational institutions, 
the government, criminal justice officials, courts, litigants, and mar-
keting companies from gathering neuroimaging information relating 
to the individual other than information voluntarily disclosed by the 
individual. 
 Finally, I use the word identity to refer to an individual’s life nar-
rative. By life narrative, I mean the ways in which individuals see 
themselves, illustrated in part by the unique stories that they tell 
themselves and others about themselves.239 Identity issues raised in 
the functional neuroimaging context include the potential of fMRI to 
reveal back to an individual one or more stories that are inconsistent 
with the individual’s dominant life narrative. 
IV.   CONFIDENTIALITY 
 I will assume that most scientists and physicians respect their 
subjects’ and patients’ confidentiality rights and would not inappro-
priately use or disclose their brain scans and related interpretations. 
Notwithstanding these assumptions, I documented in Part III the 
speculation that functional neuroimaging information created by sci-
entists and providers will leak beyond the research and clinical con-
texts and become available to employers, insurers, and others for use 
in hiring, firing, underwriting, and similar business decisions. Ac-
cordingly, I explore in this Part both traditional and unique confiden-
tiality issues raised by various uses and disclosures of functional 
                                                                                                                    
and “easily confused”); Sheri A. Alpert, Protecting Medical Privacy: Challenges in the Age 
of Genetic Information, 59 J. SOC. ISSUES 301, 302 (2003) (noting various definitions of pri-
vacy).  
 237. See, e.g., Henry T. Greely, Prediction, Litigation, Privacy, and Property: Some Pos-
sible Legal and Social Implications of Advances in Neuroscience, in NEUROSCIENCE AND 
THE LAW: BRAIN, MIND, AND THE SCALES OF JUSTICE 114, 143 (Brent Garland ed., 2004).  
 238. Id. 
 239. ARTHUR W. FRANK, THE WOUNDED STORYTELLER: BODY, ILLNESS, AND ETHICS 75 
(1995); Bernstein, supra note 236, at 974. 
2006]                          NEURO EXCEPTIONALISM? 443 
 
neuroimaging information under a selection of relevant legal au-
thorities. Unique confidentiality issues raised by functional neuroi-
maging, including the inadvertent disclosure of facial images and the 
questions raised by incidental findings, are discussed under the au-
thorities that are particularly relevant, with the recognition that 
similar analyses could be made under other authorities. 
A.   The Common Rule 
 Functional MRI is frequently used as a tool for investigations in 
human cognitive neuroscience.240 The regulations that apply most di-
rectly to investigations involving human subjects are the Protection 
of Human Subjects regulations (the Common Rule), the first version 
of which was published by the Federal Department of Health, Educa-
tion, and Welfare in 1974.241 Today, the Common Rule regulates all 
research involving human subjects that receive federal financial sup-
port from a signatory federal agency,242 “research conducted in con-
templation of a submission to the Food and Drug Administration 
[FDA] for approval,” and human subjects research conducted by an 
institution that has signed a multiple project assurance, which is an 
institutional promise “to comply with the Common Rule in all re-
search, regardless of the funding source.”243 Most, but not all, scien-
tists are federally funded, working under a multiple project assur-
ance, or submitting projects to the FDA. The Common Rule and its 
confidentiality protections thus will apply to most, but not all, fMRI 
research. 
 When the Common Rule does apply to a particular fMRI study, an 
institutional review board (IRB) must review and approve the proto-
col in accordance with certain criteria244 that were established to pro-
tect the welfare of human subjects245 One criterion requires the IRB 
to determine that adequate protections exist to maintain the confi-
dentiality of research data.246 An additional provision requires the in-
formed consent documentation signed by the research subject to de-
scribe the extent to which confidentiality of records identifying the 
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subject will be maintained.247 A third provision permits an IRB to 
waive the requirement for the investigator to obtain a signed consent 
form if the IRB finds “[t]hat the only record linking the subject and 
the research would be the consent document and the principal risk 
would be potential harm resulting from a breach of confidentiality.”248 
In this case, the subject shall be asked whether she wants documen-
tation linking her with the research, and her wishes shall govern.249 
 These three provisions are the only provisions in the Common 
Rule that address confidentiality in human subjects research, and 
HHS has not provided significant guidance regarding their design, 
interpretation, and application. HHS has generally interpreted the 
“adequate provisions” language in the first provision to require in-
vestigators to “replace[ ] names and other identifiers with codes and 
[to] store[ ] paper and electronic research records securely.”250 HHS 
commentary published in the Federal Register in 1981 further re-
veals that the confidentiality provisions were not intended to be ab-
solute251 and that a reasonableness standard should apply in deter-
mining the adequacy of each study’s confidentiality provisions.252 
HHS suggested in the same commentary that confidentiality provi-
sions might be reasonable if they required the investigator to apply 
for a certificate of confidentiality, which is a legal mechanism that 
protects the investigator from making compulsory disclosures of 
study data.253 
 The Common Rule places the burden on the IRB to determine the 
adequacy of the investigator’s confidentiality protections and the 
adequacy of the statement in the informed consent documentation, if 
not waived, regarding the extent to which confidentiality of records 
identifying the subject will be maintained.254 For the IRB to make 
such a determination, the investigator needs to describe to the IRB 
the specific confidentiality policies and procedures that have been es-
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tablished for the study. In the functional neuroimaging context, rele-
vant policies and procedures certainly could involve replacing names 
and other identifiers embedded in neuroimages or contained on re-
cord labels with codes; storing raw image data and related paper and 
electronic research records securely during the research study; plan-
ning for the long-term storage and use of raw image data and related 
records; and ensuring that any neuroimages and related data sets 
and reports that are disclosed to neuroimaging databanks and other 
third parties are completely stripped of all identifiers, including any 
image elements that could be reconstructed into cranial-facial fea-
tures. The IRB is required to review any such policies and procedures 
and determine their adequacy.255  
 Unfortunately, some scientists do not provide sufficient descrip-
tions of their confidentiality provisions to enable the IRB to deter-
mine whether the provisions are adequate. Indeed, the OHRP found 
in October 2005 that IRBs frequently lack information to determine 
whether a particular research protocol has adequate confidentiality 
provisions.256 According to the OHRP, many IRBs only review mini-
mal information, such as boilerplate informed consent language, re-
garding the establishment of confidentiality policies and proce-
dures.257 The OHRP concluded that IRBs appear not to be systemati-
cally or rigorously considering confidentiality issues.258 In summary, 
the Common Rule establishes a framework for protecting the confi-
dentiality of some, but not all, fMRI study data. How well particular 
scientists using fMRI—and IRBs reviewing fMRI studies—adhere to 
this framework is unclear. 
 The Common Rule also does not address the unique confidential-
ity concerns raised by neuroimaging data sharing requirements. The 
sharing of data is important to many areas of science, including as-
trophysics, proteomics, and genomics.259 GenBank, a genome data-
base, is a specific example of how data sharing has been used to 
benefit science and society.260 Neuroscience also stands to benefit 
from data sharing. Experts estimated in 2001 that investigators were 
conducting approximately 1,500 new brain imaging studies each 
year, involving 10,000 human subjects and 100 terabytes of neuroi-
maging data, although published studies revealed only a small por-
                                                                                                                    
 255. Id. at 8383. 
 256. OFFICE HUM. RES. PROTS, DIV. OF COMPLIANCE OVERSIGHT, OHRP COMPLIANCE 
OVERSIGHT ACTIVITIES: SIGNIFICANT FINDINGS AND CONCERNS OF NONCOMPLIANCE 3 
(2005). 
 257. Id. at 3, 10. 
 258. Id. at 3. 
 259. Governing Council of the Organization for Human Brain Mapping, Neuroimaging 
Databases, 292 SCI. 1673, 1673 (2001) [hereinafter Organization for Human Mapping]. 
 260. John D. Van Horn & Michael S. Gazzaniga, Databasing fMRI Studies—Towards a 
‘Discovery Science’ of Brain Function, 3 NATURE REV. NEUROSCIENCE 314, 314 (2002).  
446  FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34:000 
 
tion of the neuroimaging data actually collected.261 Proponents of 
neuroimaging databanks believe that databanks make neuroimaging 
data more accessible for sharing, which facilitates the comparison of 
neuroimaging findings across laboratories, allows for better assess-
ment of the reliability of methods and reproducibility of results, en-
courages meta-analyses that explore phenomena that are not appar-
ent in individual data sets, and provides investigators who do not 
have access to neuroimaging facilities the opportunity to conduct re-
search using existing data.262 
 To that end, the National Science Foundation funded263 the fMRI 
Data Center (fMRIDC),264 “a public repository of peer-reviewed fMRI 
studies and their underlying data.”265 In addition to the National In-
stitutes of Health (NIH), which requires all investigators who submit 
applications seeking $500,000 or more in direct costs in a single year 
to address data sharing in their applications,266 the Journal of Cogni-
tive Neuroscience at one point required its authors to submit their 
complete fMRI study data to the fMRIDC as a condition of publica-
tion,267 and some scientists encourage the disclosure of neuroimaging 
information to neuroimaging databanks to speed the understanding 
of cognitive processes and the neural substrates that underlie 
them.268 The issue is whether scientists jeopardize data confidential-
ity when they submit functional neuroimaging information to neuro-
imaging databanks in accordance with funding and publication re-
quirements. 
 If scientists de-identify data before making databank submissions, 
the subjects’ confidentiality concerns should be minimized because 
                                                                                                                    
 261. Organization for Human Brain Mapping, supra note 259, at 1673. 
 262. Sylvain Faisan et al., Unsupervised Learning and Mapping of Active Brain Func-
tional MRI Signals Based on Hidden Semi-Markov Event Sequence Models, 24 IEEE 
TRANSACTIONS ON MED. IMAGING 263, 263 (2005); Joan O’C. Hamilton, Journey to the Cen-
ter of the Mind: “Functional” MRI Is Yielding a Clearer Picture of What Thoughts Look 
Like, BUS. WK., Apr. 19, 2004, at 78; Organization for Human Brain Mapping, supra note 
259, at 1673. 
 263. See fMRI Data Center, 15 OBSERVER (Am. Psychol. Soc’y), Jan. 2002, at 1 
(“Thanks to a substantial grant from the National Science Foundation, the fMRI Data 
Center opened its virtual doors in the autumn of 1999.”). 
 264. fMRI Data Center, General Information, 
http://www.fmridc.org/aboutus/index.html?id=nsT7bmAj (last visited June 22, 2007). 
 265. fMRI Data Center, Welcome to the fMRI Data Center, http://www.fmridc.org/ (last 
visited June 22, 2007). 
 266. NAT’L INSTS. OF HEALTH, FINAL NIH STATEMENT ON SHARING RESEARCH DATA, 
Notice NOT-OD-030032 (2003), available at http://grants.nih.gov/grants/guide/notice-
files/NOT-OD-03-032.html. 
 267. Elliott Marshall, A Ruckus over Releasing Images of the Human Brain, 289 SCI. 
1458, 1458 (2000). 
 268. John D. Van Horn et al., The Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging Data Cen-
ter (fMRIDC): The Challenges and Rewards of Large-Scale Databasing of Neuroimaging 
Studies, 356 PHIL. TRANSACTIONS ROYAL SOC’Y B: BIOLOGICAL SCI. 1323, 1324-25 (2001); 
See Van Horn & Gazzaniga, supra note 260, at 318. 
2006]                          NEURO EXCEPTIONALISM? 447 
 
the data cannot be traced back to the subjects. The Common Rule re-
gards information as not individually identifiable if the information 
“cannot be linked to specific individuals by the investigator(s) either 
directly or indirectly through coding systems.”269 Scientists routinely 
strip neuroimaging data of direct identifiers, such as names and 
birth dates, to render the data not identifiable prior to data shar-
ing.270 However, rendering data not identifiable is further compli-
cated in the functional neuroimaging context because of the existence 
of computer software that is capable of generating images of a sub-
ject’s cranio-facial features from raw neuroimaging data.271 Func-
tional neuroimaging thus raises unique confidentiality issues relat-
ing to the possible inadvertent disclosure of subjects’ facial images. 
To ensure that individuals who later mine neuroimaging databanks 
cannot recreate subjects' facial images, scientists must strip, scram-
ble, or obscure image elements in scans and datasets that are sub-
mitted to databanks.272 
 The fMRIDC is aware of the unique confidentiality issues raised 
by the sharing of raw neuroimaging data and has established author 
guidelines designed to maintain the confidentiality of that data. The 
guidelines require authors to remove identifiers such as name, sub-
ject initials, social security number, and internal subject identifica-
tion codes before data is submitted to the fMRIDC.273 If an author 
fails to remove one or more identifiers, the fMRIDC will upon receipt 
of the data remove the identifiers itself.274 To eliminate the possibility 
that high-resolution fMRI images can be reconstructed to reveal the 
contours of subjects’ faces, the fMRIDC also strips high-resolution 
images of any remaining facial features.275 Finally, the fMRIDC rec-
ommends that investigators include statements in their informed 
consent forms identifying the potential for anonymized data collected 
from study participants to be made publicly available through the 
fMRIDC.276 Confidentiality concerns associated with neuroimaging 
databanks, although potentially significant, will be realized only 
when an investigator does not de-identify information prior to data-
bank disclosure and if the receiving databank has failed to establish 
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and adhere to internal de-identification policies and procedures like 
those established by the fMRIDC. 
B.   The Privacy Rule 
 Enacted on August 21, 1996, the Health Insurance Portability and 
Accountability Act (HIPAA)277 was designed primarily to eliminate 
employees’ unwillingness to change jobs due to fear that they would 
not qualify for health insurance at their new places of employment.278 
A second purpose, added later during the legislative process, was 
administrative simplification, or the more efficient processing of 
health claims through standard electronic transactions.279 Anticipat-
ing public concern about the confidentiality implications of shared 
electronic health information, Congress included a provision in 
HIPAA directing the federal Department of Health and Human Ser-
vices (HHS) to adopt health information privacy280 regulations if 
Congress failed to pass privacy legislation within three years of 
HIPAA’s date of enactment.281 When Congress missed its own dead-
line, HHS became responsible for adopting privacy regulations.282 
Today, HHS’ Privacy Rule (Privacy Rule)283 is codified in the same ti-
tle of the Code of Federal Regulations as is the Common Rule.284 
 The Privacy Rule only applies to covered entities, defined to in-
clude health care providers who transmit health information in elec-
tronic form in connection with certain standard transactions.285 
Many, but not all, health care providers transmit health information 
in electronic form in connection with insurance claims and other 
standard transactions. The Privacy Rule thus will apply to many of 
the radiologists, neurologists, hospitals, and imaging centers that 
create and use functional neuroimages to assist with neurosurgery 
and other treatments and procedures in the clinical setting. 
 However, fMRI currently is being used more frequently in the re-
search context as a tool for investigations in human cognitive neuro-
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science.286 The application of the Privacy Rule to scientists who use 
fMRI to test various research hypotheses is less straightforward. If 
an investigator does not provide health care or does not transmit 
health information in electronic form in connection with a standard 
transaction such as a claim for reimbursement, the Privacy Rule will 
not regulate the investigator’s research activities. Many of the stud-
ies discussed in Part III simply investigated the neural correlates of 
a range of social behaviors and characteristics such as deception, 
consumer preferences, romantic and maternal attachment, ethical 
decision making, and intelligence. These research projects did not in-
volve the provision to study volunteers of health care—such as medi-
cal treatment, surgical procedures, counseling, or drugs—or the elec-
tronic billing of insurance companies for such health care. The Pri-
vacy Rule thus does not apply to all of the scientists who are conduct-
ing fMRI studies. The Privacy Rule also does not apply to many of 
the other individuals and organizations reported to have an interest 
in the creation or use of functional neuroimaging information, includ-
ing employers, life insurance companies, educational institutions, 
criminal justice officials, courts, litigants, and marketing compa-
nies.287 
 In addition, the Privacy Rule only regulates covered entities’ use 
and disclosure of a certain class of information known as protected 
health information,288 which is generally defined as individually iden-
tifiable health information.289 Health information includes informa-
tion that “[r]elates to the past, present, or future physical or mental 
health or condition of an individual . . . [as well as] the provision of 
health care to an individual.”290 For example, a structural MRI show-
ing diffuse brain damage resulting from traumatic brain injury or 
stroke would constitute health information because the MRI would 
relate to the past and present physical health of the individual. An 
fMRI that is interpreted to reveal that an individual has schizophre-
nia or will develop Alzheimer’s disease also would constitute health 
information because the interpretations would relate to the subject’s 
current and future mental health.  
 But, what about fMRI scans that are taken for purposes of study-
ing many of the social phenomena identified in Part III? For exam-
ple, what if fMRI is used to study one-time deception that does not 
rise to the level of pathological lying (“I do not have the 5-of-clubs 
card”)? What about an fMRI scan that shows amygdala activity in-
terpreted as unconscious social evaluation of a person who belongs to 
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a different social or racial group? What about an fMRI scan that is 
interpreted to reveal an individual's preference for a particular soft 
drink, automobile, campaign advertisement, or movie trailer? A very 
technical argument exists that these latter pieces of neuroimaging 
information do not constitute health information protected by the 
Privacy Rule because they do not relate to the physical or mental 
health or condition of an individual. 
 Health information must be individually identifiable to be regu-
lated by the Privacy Rule.291 An fMRI scan would be considered indi-
vidually identifiable if it contained either an embedded direct identi-
fier or one on a label, such as a patient or subject’s name or social se-
curity number.292 As with the Common Rule, the question of whether 
raw neuroimaging data is inherently identifiable because of its abil-
ity to be reconstructed by computer software into cranial-facial fea-
ture images also exists under the Privacy Rule, especially because 
the Privacy Rule considers “[f]ull face photographic images, ” “com-
parable images,” “and any other unique identifying characteristics” 
to be identifiers.293 
 Unlike the Common Rule, which provides little guidance regard-
ing how scientists are supposed to maintain the confidentiality of 
study data, the Privacy Rule contains detailed provisions that at-
tempt to balance individuals’ confidentiality rights against various 
needs for protected health information. For example, the Privacy 
Rule permits covered entities to use and disclose protected health in-
formation without prior authorization for the activities of treatment, 
reimbursement, and health care operations, as well as twelve addi-
tional public policy activities.294 A brief review of some of these per-
mitted uses and disclosures shows just how frequently the confiden-
tiality of functional neuroimaging information is not required to be 
maintained.  
 Treatment is defined to include “the provision, coordination, [and] 
management of health care and related services.”295 Again, the Pri-
vacy Rule permits covered entities to use and disclose protected 
health information for treatment activities without the prior permis-
sion of the subject of the information. The theory is that patients who 
consent to treatment impliedly consent to health care providers using 
their information as part of such treatment. 
 However, somewhat unique confidentiality concerns are raised in 
the clinical and research settings when fMRI reveals incidental find-
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ings.296 For example, what happens when an individual consents to 
research designed to test a hypothesis relating to the treatment of 
schizophrenia, but the covered scientist discovers through fMRI that 
the subject has an unrelated brain tumor? How can the scientist en-
sure that the individual obtains treatment for the brain tumor while 
maintaining confidentiality as is required by the Privacy Rule?  
 The ability of fMRI and other neuroimaging technologies to reveal 
incidental findings has drawn significant attention in the neuroeth-
ics literature.297 Several recent studies have analyzed the extent to 
which scientists have discovered arteriovenous malformations, brain 
tumors, developmental abnormalities, and other conditions in 
healthy controls who volunteer for neuroimaging research.298 A 2004 
study designed in part to characterize the frequency and severity of 
incidental findings in fMRIs detected incidental findings in 47% of 
the 151 scans examined and classified 6.6% of the scans as requiring 
clinical follow-up.299 The authors of a second study published in 2004 
found substantial variability in investigators’ procedures for han-
dling unanticipated findings.300 Of six consent forms reviewed by the 
authors during the second study, four did not contain any language 
specifically addressing unanticipated findings,301 although one inves-
tigator whose procedures were reviewed did report unanticipated 
findings directly to the research subject’s primary care provider ac-
cording to provisions in the consent form explaining that such report-
ing would take place.302 
 How does the Privacy Rule regulate such referrals and reports? If 
a covered scientist makes an incidental finding, is the scientist le-
gally and ethically permitted or required to send the scan to the sub-
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ject’s primary care provider or a radiologist for review? Because the 
Privacy Rule broadly defines treatment to include “the coordination 
or management of health care by a health care provider with a third 
party,” as well as consultations and referrals,303 a covered scientist is 
legally permitted by the Privacy Rule to disclose an abnormal fMRI 
scan to another health care provider, including a primary care pro-
vider, neurosurgeon, or other physician, for treatment, even without 
the prior written authorization of the research subject.304 Although 
the scientist arguably has an ethical obligation to notify the subject 
of the incidental finding, as discussed in more detail in Part VI, the 
Privacy Rule does not legally require a covered scientist to obtain fol-
low-up or treatment for the subject because the Privacy Rule does not 
contain substantive reporting or treatment mandates. 
 Treatment is just one of the activities for which covered providers 
and scientists are permitted to use and disclose protected health in-
formation without the prior authorization of the patient or research 
subject. The Privacy Rule also permits covered entities to use and 
disclose protected health information for twelve enumerated public 
policy activities, which are also referred to as “exceptions” to the gen-
eral authorization requirement.305 Because these exceptions provide 
examples of situations in which the confidentiality of fMRI records 
are not required to be maintained, a brief review of their provisions 
is worthwhile. 
 The first exception that is potentially relevant in the functional 
neuroimaging context relates to uses and disclosures of protected 
health information that are required by law. The Privacy Rule ex-
pressly permits covered entities to use or disclose protected health 
information without prior authorization if the “use or disclosure is 
required by law and . . . complies with and is limited to the relevant 
requirements of such law.”306 For example, if a covered entity discov-
ers during an fMRI scan a condition that state law requires to be re-
ported to a local health department or similar agency, then the Pri-
vacy Rule permits, but does not require, the entity to make the in-
formation disclosure. A specific example might involve uncontrolled 
sleepiness or seizures associated with sleep apnea, narcolepsy, epi-
lepsy, or other neurological disorders, which some states require di-
agnosing physicians to report to the appropriate state agency.307  
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 The Privacy Rule permits disclosures required by another law if 
the disclosure “complies with and is limited to the relevant require-
ments of such law.”308 If the information required by the law is a one-
word diagnosis, the Privacy Rule thus would prohibit the disclosure 
of an underlying fMRI scan. However, many state laws require the 
disclosure of more than one-word diagnoses.309 A Wisconsin reporting 
form asks longer questions such as, “Does this person’s neurological 
condition involve movement disorder? If yes, please explain.”310 The 
Wisconsin reporting form does request EEG (although not yet fMRI) 
results.311 
 A second exception relates to uses and disclosures of protected 
health information for public health activities. Among other activi-
ties, the Privacy Rule permits covered entities to disclose protected 
health information to a public health authority “for the purpose of 
preventing or controlling disease, injury, or disability,” and to make 
reports regarding the quality, safety, or efficacy of a Food and Drug 
Administration regulated product or activity.312 This provision ex-
pressly permits covered entities to report diseases, injuries, vital 
events, and the conduct of public health surveillance, public health 
investigations, and public health interventions to public health au-
thorities such as the federal Center for Disease Control and Preven-
tion and state health departments.313 Among other things, this provi-
sion would allow a covered entity to disclose a disease or injury de-
tected by fMRI to a local public health authority without prior au-
thorization of the individual who is the subject of the image if the 
purpose of the disclosure is to prevent or control disease, injury, or 
disability. 
 A third exception relates to uses and disclosures of protected 
health information for certain health oversight activities. Under this 
provision, covered entities are permitted to disclose protected health 
information to health oversight agencies—such as HHS, the Centers 
for Medicare and Medicaid Services, the Food and Drug Administra-
tion, and the OHRP—for oversight activities authorized by law.314 
Oversight activities are defined to include “audits; civil, administra-
tive, or criminal investigations; inspections; licensure or disciplinary 
actions; civil, administrative, or criminal proceedings or actions; or 
other activities necessary for appropriate oversight of . . . [t]he health 
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care system.”315 For example, if the OHRP conducted an investigation 
of alleged research misconduct by a number of investigators at a par-
ticular institution, the investigators would be permitted to disclose 
their research records, including fMRI study records, in response to a 
demand for such records by the OHRP. 
 A fourth exception relates to the disclosure of protected health in-
formation for judicial and administrative proceedings.316 This provi-
sion permits covered entities to disclose protected health information 
in the course of a judicial or administrative proceeding “[i]n response 
to an order of a court or administrative tribunal” if the covered entity 
“discloses only the protected health information expressly authorized 
by such order.”317 If a court orders a covered entity to disclose an 
fMRI scan, the Privacy Rule permits the entity to do so. This provi-
sion also permits covered health care providers and scientists to dis-
close protected health information “[i]in response to a subpoena, dis-
covery request, or other lawful process, that is not accompanied by” a 
court order if the covered provider or scientist receives certain assur-
ances specified in the Privacy Rule from the party seeking the infor-
mation.318 Even without a court order, then, a covered entity is per-
mitted to disclose an fMRI scan or related report in the litigation 
context if the entity obtains the specified assurances from the party 
seeking the information. 
 A fifth exception relates to disclosures of protected health infor-
mation for law enforcement purposes. This provision permits covered 
entities providers and scientists to disclose protected health informa-
tion to law enforcement officials for certain law enforcement pur-
poses.319 One such purpose involves “a law enforcement official’s re-
quest for . . . information about an individual who is or is suspected 
to be a victim of a crime.”320 In the structural neuroimaging context, a 
relevant example might involve a radiologist who interpreted a 
neuroimage as revealing shaken-baby syndrome.321 In the functional 
neuroimaging context, a futuristic, speculative example might in-
volve a scientist who interpreted an fMRI as revealing that certain 
areas of a rape victim’s brain were activated when she was shown an 
image of a particular criminal or the scene of the rape. The Privacy 
Rule would permit the covered radiologist or scientist to disclose in-
                                                                                                                    
 315. Id. § 164.512(d)(1). 
 316. Id. § 164.512(e)(1)(i). 
 317. Id. § 164.512(e)(1)(i). 
 318. Id. § 164.512(e)(1)(ii)-(iv). 
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 321. See, e.g., Committee on Child Abuse and Neglect, American Academy of Pediat-
rics, Shaken Baby Syndrome: Rotational Cranial Injuries—Technical Report, 108 
PEDIATRICS 206, 208 (2001). 
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formation needed by the law enforcement officer to enforce applicable 
laws relating to child abuse and rape, respectively. 
 A sixth exception relates to research activities. The Privacy Rule 
permits covered entities to use and disclose protected health infor-
mation without prior authorization for four types of research activi-
ties.322 These include retrospective research using the information of 
decedents,323 certain reviews of information that are preparatory to 
research,324 situations in which an IRB or privacy board has approved 
the waiver of the otherwise required authorization to use or disclose 
information,325 and situations in which the researcher will only be us-
ing a limited data set of information and the researcher has executed 
a data use agreement with the data holder.326 
 An example of the second type of research activity might involve 
an investigator who would like to review a class of protected health 
information, such as “all fMRI scans and records of patients who 
have had brain surgery in the last five years,” to determine whether 
a sufficient number of patients exist to test a particular hypothesis 
relating to the assistance provided by fMRI in planning surgical 
routes or assessing surgical risk. The Privacy Rule would permit a 
workforce member of the health care facility that maintains the fMRI 
scans and related records to contact and recruit the patients without 
prior IRB approval or patient authorization once the investigator has 
determined that her hypothesis is testable and makes certain repre-
sentations regarding her use of the fMRI scans and related records. 
 A seventh exception relates to uses and disclosures of protected 
health information that are necessary to avert serious threats to 
health or safety.327 The Privacy Rule expressly permits a covered en-
tity to  
use or disclose protected health information, if the covered entity 
in good faith, believes the use or disclosure . . . [i]s necessary to 
prevent or lessen a serious and imminent threat to the health or 
safety of a person or the public . . . and [i]s to a person or persons 
reasonably able to prevent or lessen the threat, including the tar-
get of the threat.328  
To the extent fMRI technology advances this far, this provision 
would permit a covered provider or scientist who had interpreted a 
particular patient’s fMRI to reveal imminent murderous tendencies 
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to reveal that information to law enforcement authorities or the 
murder target. 
 An eighth exception relates to national security and intelligence 
activities. One portion of this provision expressly permits a covered 
entity to “disclose protected health information to authorized federal 
officials for the conduct of lawful intelligence, counter-intelligence, 
and other national security activities authorized by the National Se-
curity Act.”329 To the extent fMRI technology advances this far, this 
provision would permit a covered entity that interprets an fMRI to 
reveal an individual’s knowledge of a terrorist activity to disclose 
relevant information to authorized federal officials without the prior 
permission of the individual. 
 In addition to these eight exceptions, the Privacy Rule expressly 
allows health care providers to condition the provision of a neuroi-
maging examination on the patient’s execution of an authorization 
form allowing the provider to disclose the fMRI test results to an em-
ployer if the purpose of the examination was to create information for 
use by the employer.330 The Privacy Rule also permits health insur-
ance companies to require an individual to sign an authorization 
form for the disclosure of her functional neuroimaging information if 
the individual would like to be considered for enrollment in the 
health plan or the information is needed for underwriting or risk-
rating determinations or to determine eligibility for benefits.331 The 
Privacy Rule thus does not prohibit a covered health care provider 
from disclosing functional neuroimaging information pursuant to an 
individual’s written authorization that is compelled by an employer 
or health insurance company. 
 In summary, the Privacy Rule only regulates covered health care 
providers when they are using or disclosing protected health infor-
mation. The Privacy Rule does not regulate all of the scientists who 
are conducting fMRI studies or all of the other parties that are re-
ported to have an interest in the creation or obtaining of functional 
neuroimaging information. In addition, the Privacy Rule expressly 
permits covered entities to use and disclose functional neuroimaging 
information for treatment, reimbursement, health care operations, 
and twelve public policy activities, at least eight of which are poten-
tially applicable in the functional neuroimaging context. Finally, the 
Privacy Rule expressly permits employers and health insurance 
companies to condition treatment and health plan enrollment on an 
individual’s execution of an authorization form for the release of her 
functional neuroimaging information. Like the Common Rule, then, 
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the Privacy Rule also establishes incomplete confidentiality protec-
tions for functional neuroimaging information. 
C.   State Law 
 In addition to federal rules, such as the Common Rule and the 
Privacy Rule, many states have medical practice acts, hospital licens-
ing laws, imaging center licensing laws, and other similar statutes 
and regulations that require certain individuals and institutions to 
maintain the confidentiality of health information in their posses-
sion.332 How a particular state law applies to the functional neuroi-
maging context depends on whether the law’s protections extend to 
scientists who do not provide health care as part of their research 
and whether the law protects social information in addition to medi-
cal records and other health-related information.333 Like the Privacy 
Rule, many state health information confidentiality laws permit the 
use and disclosure of health information without prior authorization 
for a range of activities.334 Many state laws also fail to prohibit or-
ganizations such as employers and health insurance companies from 
requiring individuals to sign an authorization form for the release of 
their functional neuroimaging information.335 Like the Common Rule 
and the Privacy Rule, then, state health information confidentiality 
laws also provide incomplete protections for functional neuroimaging 
information.  
D.   Certificates of Confidentiality 
 Congress initially provided for certificates of confidentiality in 
1970 as part of the national war on drugs.336 The certificates were de-
signed to assure research subjects who participated in drug addiction 
and abuse studies that the information they shared with researchers 
                                                                                                                    
 332. With some exceptions, the Privacy Rule preempts state laws that provide less 
stringent confidentiality protections, although more stringent state laws may survive pre-
emption. 45 C.F.R. § 160.203(b). 
 333. Although beyond the scope of this Article, a fifty-state survey of health informa-
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ject. See JOY PRITTS ET AL., THE STATE OF HEALTH PRIVACY: AN UNEVEN TERRAIN (A 
COMPREHENSIVE SURVEY OF STATE HEALTH STATUTES) (1999).  
 334. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 144.335(3a)(b) (2005) (permitting the release of health re-
cords for a number of public policy activities); TEX. OCC. CODE ANN. § 159.003 (Vernon 
2005) (listing a number of exceptions to confidentiality in court or administrative proceed-
ings); id. § 159.004 (2000) (listing a number of exceptions to confidentiality in other situa-
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 335. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 144.335(3c) (2006) (permitting health care providers to re-
lease health records as directed as part of an independent medical examination to the third 
party who requested or paid for the examination). 
 336. Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-
513, §50d, 84 Stat. 1236, 1271 (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 872(c)). 
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would remain completely confidential.337 Congress amended the Pub-
lic Health Service Act in 1988 to authorize agencies within HHS to 
issue certificates of confidentiality to investigators engaged in all 
biomedical, behavioral, clinical, mental health, and other research 
studies, not just research relating to drug addiction and abuse.338 To-
day, certificates of confidentiality allow investigators to withhold 
names and other identifiable data about research participants that 
otherwise may be summoned “under Federal, State, or local civil, 
criminal, administrative, legislative, or other proceedings.”339 The 
NIH has taken the position that certificates of confidentiality, which 
have been available for non-federally funded research since 1993,340 
supersede contrary state and federal laws, and case law has upheld 
certificates of confidentiality against otherwise compulsory disclo-
sures.341 
 Certificates of confidentiality can provide additional confidential-
ity protections in the functional neuroimaging context, but investiga-
tors must be knowledgeable about their application. A certificate of 
confidentiality can only be requested for a research project that in-
volves the gathering of sensitive information.342 Information is sensi-
tive if its disclosure “could have adverse consequences for subjects or 
damage their financial standing, employability, insurability, or repu-
tation.”343 Examples of information the NIH has classified as sensi-
tive include genetic information; information relating to the psycho-
logical well-being of human subjects; information on subjects’ sexual 
attitudes, preferences, or practices; and data on substance abuse or 
illegal conduct.344 As discussed in Part III, fMRI has the potential to 
reveal sensitive information about individuals, including their men-
tal health, sexual preferences, and addictive tendencies, and specula-
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tion exists that employers, insurance companies, and others may at-
tempt to obtain this information. Research involving fMRI thus may 
be ripe for the additional confidentiality protections provided by cer-
tificates of confidentiality.  
 Although certificates of confidentiality protect investigators from 
making otherwise compulsory disclosures, they do not prohibit inves-
tigators from making noncompulsory, unauthorized disclosures.345 
Certificates of confidentiality thus are helpful when an investigator 
desires to maintain the confidentiality of her subjects’ data; however, 
the certificates are not especially helpful when an investigator inten-
tionally or unknowingly breaches confidentiality in a situation not 
involving compulsion. Certificates of confidentiality, which are re-
search-project - and not investigator - or institution - specific, also 
must be requested by the investigator from the applicable agency 
prior to the beginning of each research project, a requirement about 
which many investigators do not know or lack the diligence to 
meet.346 Because certificates of confidentiality can fill some of the 
confidentiality gaps left by the Common Rule, the Privacy Rule, and 
state law,347 investigators engaged in functional neuroimaging re-
search should be encouraged to apply for a certificate prior to the 
commencement of each research project. IRBs also should be edu-
cated regarding the protections provided by certificates of confidenti-
ality and regarding their application process.348 
 In summary, confidentiality provisions in the Common Rule, the 
Privacy Rule, state law, and the certificate of confidentiality provi-
sions do not protect all functional neuroimaging information. First, 
these confidentiality provisions do not regulate all of the individuals 
and organizations reported to have an interest in the creation or use 
of functional neuroimaging information. Second, the first three confi-
dentiality provisions permit the disclosure of functional neuroimag-
ing information to several categories of third parties for various pub-
lic policy activities the benefit of which may not outweigh the unique 
confidentiality interests of research subjects and patients in their 
functional neuroimaging information. Third, and perhaps most im-
portantly, the first three provisions do not prevent third parties such 
as employers and insurance companies from requiring individuals to 
                                                                                                                    
 345. See, e.g., Mark A. Rothstein & Meghan A. Talbott, Compelled Authorizations for 
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authorize disclosures of their functional neuroimaging information 
for use in fitness-for-duty, insurance coverage, and other decisions.  
V.   PRIVACY 
 Part IV argued that existing principles of confidentiality incom-
pletely protect functional neuroimaging information in part because 
individuals can be forced to authorize disclosures of their functional 
neuroimaging information. This Part builds on this point by examin-
ing the privacy implications of advances of functional neuroimaging, 
including the interest of individuals in avoiding the unwanted collec-
tion of their functional neuroimaging information in the clinical, re-
search, employment, and insurance contexts.349 Privacy losses in 
these contexts are concerning because they can result in psychologi-
cal harm, including worry, irritation, fear, embarrassment, and self-
doubt; social harm, including stigmatization; economic harm, includ-
ing employment discrimination, loss of insurance benefits and inabil-
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ity to obtain insurance coverage; and legal harm, including arrest or 
conviction of a crime.350 
A.   The Clinical and Research Contexts 
 Functional MRI raises both traditional and unique privacy con-
cerns in the clinical and research contexts. For example, if a research 
subject consents to a neuromarketing study the stated purpose of 
which is to test whether a particular automobile design activates the 
part of the brain known to be related to attention and interest, but 
the investigator also discovers that the subject has a brain tumor or 
interprets the subject’s fMRI scan as revealing that the subject has a 
particular mental health condition, the subject arguably had a pri-
vacy interest in avoiding the unwanted intrusions into her physical 
and mental health conditions. After all, she only consented to have 
her brain studied to determine whether she found the automobile 
appealing. 
 Privacy concerns vary by type and context, and procedures de-
signed to protect the privacy of patients and research subjects in one 
setting may not be sufficient in the functional neuroimaging setting. 
Factors such as culture, ethnicity, age, socioeconomic status, gender, 
locale, the nature and context of the research, and the social and po-
litical environment affect individuals’ sense of privacy differently, 
and providers and scientists cannot assume that each patient or re-
search subject will regard the same things as private.351 As an illus-
tration, some patients and research subjects freely share their sexual 
experiences in response to queries about such experiences, while a 
request for information regarding sexual practices may be offensive 
to others.352 Respecting privacy in the functional neuroimaging con-
text thus requires more than obtaining consent to access neuroimag-
ing information.353 To respect privacy, health care providers and in-
vestigators must tailor privacy protections to particular treatments 
and research studies. Providers and investigators must explain the 
privacy implications of their research, including the fact that fMRI 
can reveal incidental findings, and provide the opportunity for pa-
tients and research subjects to control, limit, or refuse access to their 
neuroimaging information, as appropriate.354 
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 Privacy guidelines offered by other disciplines, including anthro-
pology, psychology, and oral history, can be instructive.355 The Code 
of Ethics of the American Anthropological Association (AAA) recites 
what by now appears to be a basic privacy right: “Anthropological re-
searchers must do everything in their power to ensure that their re-
search does not harm the . . . privacy of the people with whom they 
work, conduct research, or perform other professional activities.”356 
Given the different types of anthropological research and the diffi-
culty of establishing a one-size-fits-all solution to privacy, the AAA 
recommends that anthropological researchers carefully and respect-
fully negotiate the limits of each research relationship.357 A similar 
negotiation approach could be applied in the clinical and research 
contexts in which fMRI is used. 
 For example, providers and scientists could clarify, as part of the 
informed consent conversation, the possibility of the discovery of un-
anticipated information as well as the different classes of information 
that have been discovered in the past, including arteriovenous mal-
formations, brain tumors and developmental abnormalities. Other 
types of health information, social information, and thought proc-
esses that could be revealed by fMRI could be described as accurately 
as then possible. Two more possibilities could also be dislosed to the 
subject: the possibility of an inaccurate interpretation and the possi-
bility that such interpretation could mislead third parties who rely 
on the interpretation to make decisions.358  
 In the volunteer research context, the individual then could be 
asked to consider whether she would be comfortable authorizing ac-
cess to this information as part of the research protocol or whether 
she would prefer to keep these pieces of information to herself, in 
which case she could elect not to participate in the research. In the 
treatment context, the individual and the provider could negotiate a 
process to be followed in the event of an unanticipated finding. Al-
though these procedures will not eliminate the discovery of inciden-
tal findings, they do give individuals more control over others’ access 
to their neuroimaging information and may lessen the chance that a 
provider or investigator will intrude on a particular individual’s 
sense of neurological privacy. 
 In the event of a neurological privacy breach, the common law of 
torts is one source of remedies. For example, the intrusion tort im-
poses liability on “[o]ne who intentionally intrudes, physically or oth-
erwise, upon the solitude or seclusion of another or his private affairs 
or concerns . . . if the intrusion would be highly offensive to a reason-
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able person.”359 The first element, an intentional physical or other in-
trusion, is frequently proved by the defendant’s “physical intrusion 
into a place in which the plaintiff has secluded” herself, such as when 
the defendant forces his way into the plaintiff’s hotel room or insists 
on entering the plaintiff’s home over her objections.360 The element 
also may be proved by nonphysical intrusions, such as when the de-
fendant uses his senses, with or without mechanical aids, to oversee 
or overhear the plaintiff’s private affairs or when the defendant looks 
into the plaintiff's upstairs windows with binoculars, taps her tele-
phone wires, or takes an unauthorized photograph of the plaintiff 
while she is in the “Fun-House.”361 
 The intentional intrusion element could be proved in several ways 
in the functional neuroimaging context. An investigator could inten-
tionally intrude on a research subject by making an unauthorized 
study of the subject’s personality or mental health when the subject 
had limited her consent to a brain scan the purpose of which was to 
study speech or language functions. If fMRI ever developed to the 
point where individuals’ brains could be scanned without their 
knowledge or authorization, the unauthorized scans also could con-
stitute nonphysical intentional intrusions. Arguably any situation in 
which an individual is required to submit to functional magnetic 
resonance imaging over her objection could implicate the intentional 
intrusion element. 
 The second element of the intrusion tort requires the intrusion to 
be upon the solitude, seclusion, private affairs, or concerns of an-
other.362 Stated another way, a defendant will be subject to liability 
for intrusion “only when he has intruded into a private place, or has 
otherwise invaded a private seclusion that the plaintiff has thrown 
about [her] person or affairs.”363 A defendant generally will not be 
subject to intrusion liability if she simply examines a public record 
concerning the plaintiff or if she photographs the plaintiff while she 
is walking down a public street, because these activities are open to 
the public eye.364 Even in a public place, however, the tort will protect 
some matters about the plaintiff, “such as [her] underwear or lack of 
it, that are not exhibited to the public gaze,” if there is an intrusion 
into such a matter.365 Thoughts, feelings, and other mental processes 
that are studied by fMRI arguably constitute “private affairs or con-
cerns” for purposes of the second element of the intrusion tort.  
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 The final element of the tort requires the intrusion to be highly of-
fensive to a reasonable person.366 Case law interpreting this element 
requires the plaintiff to prove that the intrusion was outrageous or 
that the intrusion would have caused “mental suffering, shame or 
humiliation to a person of ordinary sensibilities.”367 Although a struc-
tural MRI showing that an individual has a perfectly symmetrical 
skull might not be considered sufficiently outrageous, a functional 
MRI that is interpreted to reveal a “defect” in character or an “im-
moral” decision making process might be considered shameful or 
humiliating to a reasonable person. 
 Whether an fMRI will constitute an intrusion will depend on sev-
eral factors, including the purpose of the fMRI, whether the patient 
voluntarily submitted to the fMRI, and the information that is ob-
tained as a result of the scan. An unauthorized fMRI would seem to 
implicate the tort more frequently than an authorized fMRI; how-
ever, an authorized research fMRI that exceeds the scope of the sub-
ject’s consent also could constitute an intrusion. 
 A second privacy tort, appropriation, has limited although possi-
ble application in the functional neuroimaging context. The appro-
priation tort creates liability for [“o]ne who appropriates to his own 
use or benefit the name or likeness of another.”368 The classic appro-
priation case involves a defendant who makes an unauthorized use of 
an attractive plaintiff’s image to advertise the defendant’s business 
or product or for some similar commercial purpose (although not all 
jurisdictions require the defendant to commercially benefit from the 
use of the plaintiff's name or likeness).369 
 Recent scholarship suggests a role for the appropriation tort370 in 
cases such as Moore v. Regents of the University of California.371 In 
Moore, the California Supreme Court decided in 1990 that plaintiff 
John Moore “had no property rights in the valuable pharmaceutical 
products that medical professionals had derived from Moore’s spleen 
cells, after they had been removed as part of his treatment for leu-
kemia.”372 In so doing, the California Supreme Court overruled a 
lower court ruling finding that Moore had an appropriation cause of 
action “based on the commodification of an aspect of his body, his 
DNA, that was so intimately bound up with his identity as to be 
analogous to his name or image.”373 Recent scholarship considers how 
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the Supreme Court could have applied the appropriation tort to in-
form and guide the legal management of Moore’s DNA as well as 
other cases involving genetic information and other “information re-
garded as intimately bound up with a subject’s identity.”374 
 Along these lines, the appropriation tort also might be used to in-
form and guide the legal management of neuroimaging information 
in certain limited situations. If a physician or investigator makes a 
neuroscientific discovery as a result of an fMRI of a particular indi-
vidual’s brain and benefits—commercially or otherwise—from the 
discovery, the patient or research subject could attempt to use the 
privacy tort of appropriation to the extent she did not license the par-
ticular benefit. To prevail, the patient or research subject would have 
to analogize her neurological identity to identity as typically repre-
sented by names or photographs and then argue that the provider or 
investigator benefited from the unauthorized appropriation of such 
neurological identity. 
B.   The Employment Context 
 There has been considerable speculation that employers will want 
to use fMRI to probe the minds of job applicants and current employ-
ees to determine whether to hire or maintain them.375 One company 
currently is marketing its brain scanning services directly to employ-
ers, and, at $30 per minute, the scans may not be prohibitively ex-
pensive for all employers, especially those who hire well-paid profes-
sional or executive personnel.376 The issue is whether fMRI violates 
applicants and employees’ interest in avoiding unwanted neurologi-
cal intrusions.  
 One potential source of privacy rights for employees and job appli-
cants is the Federal Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA).377 Title I 
of the ADA prohibits certain employers from discriminating on the 
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basis of disability against qualified individuals with disabilities.378 As 
one way of preventing disability discrimination, Title I regulates cov-
ered employers’ use of “qualification standards, employment tests or 
other selection criteria that screen out or tend to screen out” indi-
viduals with disabilities on the basis of such disabilities (the screen-
ing provisions).379 Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 
(EEOC) regulations interpreting Title I define disability to include 
physical and mental impairments—including neurological disorders, 
mental illnesses, and specific learning disabilities—“that substan-
tially limit[ ] one or more major life activities of [an] individual.”380 
EEOC regulations also clarify, however, that the following do not 
constitute disabilities protected by the ADA: pedophilia, pyromania, 
kleptomania, compulsive gambling, homosexuality, bisexuality, 
transvestism, transsexualism, exhibitionism, voyeurism, and certain 
other physical, psychological, environmental, cultural, and economic 
characteristics, including “common personality traits such as poor 
judgment or quick temper.”381 
 Applying these screening provisions to the functional neuroimag-
ing context yields interesting results. The ADA’s screening provisions 
would regulate a covered employer’s use of fMRI test results in an at-
tempt to screen out individuals who have depression, schizophrenia, 
or bipolar disorder if such conditions substantially limit a major life 
activity of the individuals tested. On the other hand, the screening 
provisions would not regulate employer attempts to screen out indi-
viduals based on fMRI “findings” of pedophilia, compulsive gambling, 
or homosexuality because these qualities do not constitute impair-
ments or disabilities.  
 Title I of the ADA also regulates the conduct and timing of medi-
cal examinations and related inquiries.382 A medical examination is 
defined as “a procedure or test that seeks information about an indi-
vidual’s physical or mental impairments or health.”383 Although a 
number of factors are relevant in determining whether a procedure 
or test is a medical examination, the EEOC clarifies that the term 
includes tests, including structural magnetic resonance imaging, that 
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provide evidence leading to the identification of conditions listed in 
the American Psychiatric Association’s most recent Diagnostic and 
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, including anxiety, depres-
sion, and certain compulsive disorders–conditions frequently studied 
by fMRI.384 The EEOC also clarifies, however, that psychological tests 
designed and used only to measure honesty, tastes, and habits–
characteristics also studied by fMRI–are not medical examinations.385 
 How the ADA regulates employers’ use of medical examinations 
depends on whether the examination is given during the preemploy-
ment, preplacement, or employment stage. The ADA generally pro-
hibits an employer from using a medical examination at the preem-
ployment stage to inquire or attempt to determine whether a particu-
lar individual has a disability or the nature or severity of such dis-
ability.386 Here, the ADA is attempting to exclude irrelevant health 
criteria from being used for employment decisions.387 The ADA thus 
would prohibit an employer from requiring a job applicant in the pre-
employment stage to submit to an fMRI examination that falls 
within the definition of a medical examination. However, the ADA’s 
medical examination provisions would appear not to regulate the use 
of an fMRI to determine honesty or deception at the preemployment 
stage because the EEOC has stated that a test to detect honesty is 
not a medical examination. 
 At the preplacement stage, however, a covered employer is per-
mitted to require a medical examination and to condition an offer of 
employment on the results of the examination “if all entering em-
ployees in the same job category are subjected to” the same examina-
tion and the information collected during the examination is main-
tained separate from personnel records and kept confidential.388 Be-
cause medical examinations conducted at the preplacement stage “do 
not have to be job-related and consistent with business necessity,”389 
an employer could require as a condition of employment that an indi-
vidual consent to a broad-based fMRI screening. However, if certain 
criteria are used to screen out an individual with one or more dis-
abilities as a result of the examination, “the exclusionary criteria 
must be job-related and consistent with business necessity” and the 
individual must not be able to perform the essential job functions 
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even with reasonable accommodation.390 It thus may be permissible 
under the ADA to condition an offer of employment for the position of 
fighter pilot on fMRI test results of an applicant’s visual cortex re-
sponse to flying stimuli, although it would not be permissible to use 
the same fMRI test results as a basis for refusing to employ an indi-
vidual for a position such as telephone operator that successfully can 
be performed by an individual who has visual impairments.  
 Finally, the ADA establishes requirements that apply to medical 
examinations given during the employment stage. An employer can 
require a medical examination of a current employee, but only if the 
medical examination is job-related and consistent with business ne-
cessity.391 The ADA thus would prohibit an employer from conducting 
a broad-based fMRI screening of current employees for “any and all 
thought processes,” although an fMRI test specifically designed to de-
termine whether an employee remains capable of performing the es-
sential functions of her job would be permissible.392 
 In summary, Title I of the ADA does provide some privacy protec-
tions for job applicants and current employees who wish to keep 
some, but not all, of their neuroimaging information private. How 
these privacy protections apply in the context of functional neuroi-
maging depends on whether the employer’s proposed fMRI test falls 
within the definition of a medical examination; the stage—
preemployment, preplacement, or employment—at which the em-
ployer requires the examination; and whether the examination or 
any exclusionary criteria are job-related and consistent with business 
necessity. The ADA does not provide complete privacy protections for 
job applicants and employees in part because it does not prohibit an 
employer from requiring an individual to sign an authorization for 
the release of her functional neuroimaging information.393 State law 
may fill some of these gaps.394 
 Although the use of fMRI as a lie detector may not be considered a 
medical examination regulated by the ADA, such use may be regu-
lated by the Federal Employee Polygraph Protection Act (EPPA). The 
EPPA prohibits certain employers from requiring employees to sub-
mit to lie detector tests,395 which “includes a polygraph, decepto-
graph, voice stress analyzer, psychological stress evaluator, or any 
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other similar device . . . that is used, or the results of which are used, 
for the purpose of rendering a diagnostic opinion regarding the hon-
esty or dishonesty of an individual.”396 The EPPA could be inter-
preted to prohibit covered employers from requiring functional 
neuroimaging examinations that could form the basis of an opinion 
regarding an individual’s dishonesty. 
 The EPPA does not, however, completely protect all employees 
from having to participate in fMRI lie detection tests. The EPPA does 
not apply “to the United States Government, any State or local gov-
ernment,” or any political subdivision of a State or local government, 
when it is acting as an employer.397 The EPPA also does not prohibit 
the federal government from requiring a lie detector test of any em-
ployee, expert, or consultant under contract with—or assigned or de-
tailed to—the Department of Defense, the Department of Energy, the 
National Security Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the Na-
tional Imagery and Mapping Agency, the Central Intelligence 
Agency, or the Federal Bureau of Investigation.398 Finally, the EPPA 
does not prohibit the use of polygraph tests on prospective employees 
“by any private employer whose primary business purpose” involves 
the provision of “armored car personnel, personnel engaged in the 
design, installation, and maintenance of security alarm systems, or 
other uniformed or plainclothes security personnel . . . whose func-
tion includes the protection of” certain facilities relating to electric or 
nuclear power, the public water supply, “radioactive or other toxic 
waste materials,” or public transportation.399  
 The EPPA thus provides some protection for non-public sector 
employees who wish to keep the honesty or deceptiveness of their 
thoughts to themselves. However, the EPPA provides few privacy 
protections for federal, state, and local government employees, as 
well as applicants and employees that provide certain security ser-
vices in the private sector. This lack of protection is significant given 
that two commercial fMRI companies are marketing their fMRI lie 
detectors to federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies.400 
C.   The Insurance Context 
 There has been some speculation that health and life insurance 
companies will require applicants for insurance to submit to fMRI 
examinations or authorize the disclosure of their functional neuroi-
maging information to determine the existence of conditions that 
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might require coverage or payouts in the near future.401 Others 
speculate that car insurance companies might require fMRI to pre-
dict drivers’ propensity to violence, aggression, or conscientious-
ness.402  
 Although HIPAA prohibits group health plans from excluding in-
dividuals from a group or charging them higher premiums based on 
health status-related factors403 and the ADA in theory “extends its 
prohibition of disability discrimination to employer-provided fringe 
benefits,”404 privacy protections in the insurance context are far from 
complete. For example, HIPAA does not protect individuals who are 
not affiliated with an entity providing group coverage, and the ADA 
has been interpreted to accept some actuarially justified discrimina-
tion even in employer-provided health insurance.405 In addition, 
many evidence of insurability forms used by issuers of health and life 
insurance coverage in the individual market already require appli-
cants to indicate whether they have ever undergone any scans or 
magnetic resonance imaging.406 If the individual so indicates, the in-
surer can require the individual to authorize the disclosure of the 
scans and related records for use in coverage decisions.407 Compre-
hensive privacy protections for neuroimaging information, thus, do 
not exist in the insurance context.408 
VI.   IDENTITY 
 In Part V I explored some of the protections available to an indi-
vidual who wishes to control or avoid the collection of her functional 
neuroimaging information by third parties, including providers, sci-
entists, employers, and insurers. Here, I explore the implications of 
fMRI for an individual’s identity, or life narrative. Identity issues 
raised in the functional neuroimaging context include the possibility 
that fMRI will reveal back to the individual who is the subject of the 
functional neuroimaging information one or more stories that are in-
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consistent with the individual’s dominant life narrative. As discussed 
in more detail below, fMRI may construct potentially unwanted iden-
tities for an individual without her consent. 
 It goes without saying that an fMRI examination, like other diag-
nostic tests and procedures, can reveal important information related 
to the purpose of the examination back to the subject of the informa-
tion. Consider an individual who suffers from major depression that 
is resistant both to drugs and psychotherapy. Functional MRI is one 
clinical tool that might be proposed to identify the particular neural 
networks that are going awry. In theory, the radiologists and neu-
rologists would discuss with the individual as part of the informed 
consent process the functional neuroimaging examination as well as 
its purpose, risks, and benefits, including the possibility of identify-
ing the areas of the brain that may be contributing to the individual’s 
depression. If the fMRI results are interpreted to locate an abnormal 
pattern of neural activity, this information would be conveyed back 
to the patient following the examination (perhaps to help the indi-
vidual to decide whether to undergo experimental deep brain stimu-
lation to modulate the affected area).409 Although the individual 
would not know before the examination whether a particular part of 
her brain was functioning abnormally, the fact that she consented to 
the examination knowing the purpose of the examination suggests 
that she considered the possibility of learning that she has an ab-
normally functioning brain region. 
 Now consider a situation in which a scientist using fMRI observes 
a condition or characteristic that is unrelated to the purpose or vari-
ables of the study. For example, an individual might consent to fMRI 
research designed to test a hypothesis relating to motor function, but 
the scientist also might interpret the fMRI as revealing that the in-
dividual has schizophrenia or pedophilia or prefers a particular 
brand of soft drink. Although many diagnostic tests and procedures 
in theory have the ability to detect incidental findings, experimental 
brain scans have been found to detect incidental findings such as ar-
teriovenous malformations, brain tumors, and developmental ab-
normalities in almost half of the scans (47%) examined.410 Unfortu-
nately, not all investigators have established policies and procedures 
to be followed in the event of an incidental finding.411 
 When an incidental finding occurs, the general consensus seems 
to be that it is ethically desirable to notify the subject of the inciden-
tal finding if the finding is “abnormal.”412 This consensus appears to 
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be based on the ethical principle of respect for persons413 as well as 
recent studies examining subjects’ expectations regarding incidental 
findings in neuroimaging research. In one study published in 2006, 
105 healthy individuals who had previously participated in neuroi-
maging studies were questioned about their expectations and atti-
tudes regarding incidental findings associated with such studies.414 
The authors found that 54% of the participants reported that they 
expected research scans to detect abnormalities if they existed and 
that more than 90% of the participants reported that they would 
want incidental findings communicated to them.415 These findings do 
support the development of a special informed consent process that 
would include making subjects aware of the possibility of potentially 
clinically significant incidental findings and that would allow them 
(or the investigator) to decide to refuse to participate in the research 
depending on the subject’s desire to be notified of the unanticipated 
findings. Indeed, one neuroscientist reportedly tells his subjects, “ ‘If 
we find any gross abnormalities in your brain, would you like a radi-
ologist to tell you about it? . . . If you answer no, we cannot do the 
test. . . .’ ”416 
 The study described in the preceding paragraph classified the sub-
jects’ desires to be notified of their incidental findings based on 
whether the finding was “benign,” “malignant, but curable,” “malig-
nant, not curable,” or a “life-threatening emergency.”417 Much of the 
discussion therein assumes that the incidental findings would in-
volve “suspicious anatomical abnormalities” or “clinically significant 
incidental neuroradiological abnormalities,” such as an arteriovenous 
malformation or a brain tumor.418 However, it is worth noting that 
the study authors found that fewer individuals (although still more 
than 90%) would want to know about benign findings compared to 
malignant and life-threatening findings.419 The question thus be-
comes whether individuals also would want to know about findings 
that are not clinically significant, such as personality, social charac-
teristics, and behavioral information. For example, if a scientist in-
terprets an fMRI as revealing that a particular individual is decep-
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tive, socially cooperative, a risk-seeker, a Democrat, or a compulsive 
gambler, should the scientist relay that information back to the indi-
vidual? 
 In these scenarios, fMRI shows its “impact on our normative con-
ception of identity.”420 Recent scholarship shows the extent to which 
technology, including genetic testing and the Internet, “alter[s] the 
social structures through which we perceive our identity.”421 For ex-
ample, an individual who discovers that she is the carrier of a neu-
rodegenerative disease such as spinocerebellar ataxia type I may be 
affected even in the absence of physical symptoms.422 After receiving 
the results that identify her as a carrier, the individual might be-
come depressed and unable to function at school or work or to enjoy 
social events.423 The individual, who may view her genes as the es-
sence of her identity, may believe that her genetic information 
threatens her decisions, social commitments, and life goals.424 In 
short, the genetic test results may exert pressure on or destabilize 
the individual’s life narrative.425 
 Like genetic testing, fMRI also can influence our normative con-
ception of identity. I will use three examples to show how an fMRI 
can exert pressure on identity. Example A involves an individual, 
whom I’ll call Amy, whose life narrative is governed by the healthy-
mindedness meta-narrative. Although individuals do tell their own 
unique stories, they tend to create their stories by adapting and com-
bining culturally available narrative types.426 One among hundreds of 
possible meta-narratives is the healthy-mindedness meta-
narrative.427 Life narratives governed by the healthy-mindedness 
meta-narrative tend to revolve around the belief that nature is in-
herently and absolutely good and around the conquering ability of 
positive emotions and relentless optimism.428 Healthy-minded indi-
viduals tend to believe that loving others, being happy, and thinking 
optimistically is all that needs to be done to live right.429 When 
healthy-minded individuals become sick or see others fall ill, they 
tend to advocate the will to live, the healing power of nature, and the 
importance of active involvement in all aspects of their treatment.430 
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 Both structural and functional MRI can threaten Amy’s healthy-
mindedness meta-narrative by revealing a terminal brain tumor 
from which she will die in a short period of time. Although Amy loves 
others and pursues optimistic thoughts, her brain tumor continues to 
develop. Amy’s physician has told her that no amount of will to live 
or active participation in treatment will save her. Amy finds that her 
body will not heal itself and that “healthy” behaviors such as main-
taining hope and eliminating toxins from her diet431 do not help. The 
MRI’s revelation of the brain tumor to Amy thus disrupts her coher-
ent sense of her life sequence, including what philosopher David Carr 
calls a “whole which comprises future, present, and past.”432 Like the 
life narrative of the individual who discovers through genetic testing 
that she carries a neurodegenerative disease, Amy’s life narrative 
also has been threatened. MRI technology has affected Amy’s sense 
of stability, motivation, and purpose in life, which was derived from 
her healthy-mindedness, and may require Amy to adopt new, and 
perhaps very different, life choices in her remaining time.433 
 The tumor example was possible given brain examinations via ei-
ther structural or functional MRI. The unique ways in which func-
tional MRI threatens identity can be illustrated by a second example, 
Example B, involving addictive behavior. Think of a scientist con-
ducting a neuromarketing study who uses fMRI to scan the brain of 
an individual, I'll call her Bea, while a computer shows Bea a series 
of product images, including bottled water, juices, soft drinks, and al-
coholic beverages produced by national and local beverage manufac-
turers. The study is designed to test a hypothesis relating to brand 
familiarity. Assume, however, that upon presentation of all of the al-
coholic beverage images the scientist observes a very significant 
BOLD response in the areas of Bea’s brain known to be related to at-
tention and interest—which the scientist interprets as revealing that 
Bea is an alcoholic.  
 Also assume, however, that Bea ten years ago successfully com-
pleted treatment and counseling for alcohol abuse. Although Bea’s 
brain still “lights up” when she sees alcoholic beverages, Bea has 
adopted behaviors that help her avoid drinking. When she is pre-
sented with a situation in which alcohol is available, Bea calls her 
Alcoholics Anonymous (AA) sponsor, attends an AA meeting, or di-
verts her attention to another task until the availability of alcohol 
has passed. These procedures have helped Bea abstain from alcohol 
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for ten years and lead a full and healthy life involving work, family, 
and social activities. Although Bea freely admits that she is vulner-
able to alcohol, she has succeeded in avoiding drinking long-term by 
adopting the behaviors learned through AA.  
 Following her fMRI examination, however, assume that Bea loses 
her confidence regarding her ability to abstain from drinking. She 
thinks that her brain is “hardwired” to drink and fears that alcohol 
will reassert its control over her life. Although Bea was confident 
that she could continue avoiding alcohol before the fMRI examina-
tion, now she feels that she always will be “just an alcoholic” and 
that she should not try to fake being healthy anymore. Bea with-
draws from her friends and family and refuses to leave her apart-
ment except to go to work for fear that she will again succumb to al-
cohol.  
 In Example B, the fMRI has constructed an identity for Bea based 
on her BOLD signal response to alcoholic beverage images, notwith-
standing that Bea’s own ten-year life narrative revolved around her 
success in avoiding drinking and her new, healthy lifestyle. The iden-
tity constructed by the fMRI in Example B conflicts with, and exerts 
a negative pressure on, Bea’s self-perceived identity. However, Bea 
might think that the identity constructed by the fMRI is not really a 
surprise given that she knows she always will be vulnerable to alco-
hol. 
 A final example, Example C, shows how fMRI has the potential to 
construct surprise identities. In Example C a scientist scans the 
brain of a woman I’ll call Clare while a computer shows Clare a se-
ries of images of attractive and unattractive men and women. The 
scientist is trying to test a hypothesis relating to the effect of pleas-
ing and unpleasing faces on the brain. While testing this hypothesis, 
however, the scientist also observes a significant BOLD response in 
the regions of Clare's brain known to be correlated with sexual at-
traction whenever Clare is presented with an image of a woman. The 
scientist interprets the results as revealing that Clare is homosexual. 
 Assume, however, that Clare, who is married to a man, believes 
that she is heterosexual and that Clare’s friends and family are hos-
tile to homosexuals and neither value nor respect same-sex attrac-
tions or relationships. Also assume that Clare’s life narrative is gov-
erned by a communitarian meta-narrative. Clare understands her 
identity as constituted by her community, including her friends and 
family. Clare is bound by community obligations and is guided by 
community values.434 Finally, assume that Clare becomes unhappy 
following the fMRI exam because she feels that the exam constructed 
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for her an unwanted identity without her consent. Clare feels that 
the scientist’s fMRI interpretation is forcing her to reconsider her 
sexual identity when she thought she was happily married to her 
husband. Clare also is worried regarding how her technologically 
constructed identity, if adopted, might conflict with the values of her 
family. In Example C, then, the fMRI has both challenged Clare’s 
heterosexual identity and threatened her communitarian meta-
narrative. Although the fMRI interpretation potentially revealed new 
insights to Clare about her sexuality, Clare might think that these 
insights present agonizing and unwanted dilemmas at this point in 
her life. 
 The theory that identity pressures merit our normative concern is 
well supported in the literature.435 The prevailing theory is that indi-
viduals need a coherent sense of their life sequence.436 Life narratives 
provide this coherence and meaning to our lives and relationships.437 
When our life narratives are threatened or disrupted, frustration and 
discontent can occur, even if no financial harm has resulted.438 Fol-
lowing these interruptions, determined attempts to recreate new 
meaning and coherence usually follow.439 
 The question thus becomes whether existing legal principles suffi-
ciently protect an individual’s interest in controlling the construction 
of her identity.440 In Parts IV and V, I showed that existing confiden-
tiality and privacy principles attempt to regulate the use and disclo-
sure of functional neuroimaging information by third parties and the 
collection of functional neuroimaging information by third parties, 
respectively. As I have defined these principles, they do not regulate 
the revelation of functional neuroimaging information back to the in-
dividual who is the subject of the information.441 However, the doc-
trine of informed consent may. 
 Informed consent is the process pursuant to which a patient or re-
search subject makes a competent, voluntary, and informed decision 
to pursue a particular medical treatment (informed consent to treat-
ment) or to participate in a particular research study (informed con-
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sent to research).442 Informed consent to treatment principles gener-
ally require the physician to disclose to the patient her diagnosis, if 
known; the nature, purpose, risks, and benefits of the proposed medi-
cal treatment or surgical procedure; alternatives to the proposed 
treatment or procedure and their risks and benefits; and the risks 
and benefits of not receiving or undergoing any treatment or proce-
dure.443 Risks generally are defined as risks that would be material to 
a reasonable person in deciding whether to undergo the procedure.444 
Regulatory informed consent to research principles are slightly more 
complex and require, among other things,445 a statement that the 
particular treatment or procedure may involve risks to the subject 
that are currently unforeseeable.446 
 The informed consent principles as described above do not ex-
pressly require a physician or scientist to tell her patient about the 
possibility of incidental findings or the pressure they place on life 
narratives. However, these principles could be interpreted or ex-
panded to do so. As discussed above, informed consent to research 
principles already require the potential research subject to be noti-
fied of risks that are currently unforeseeable. Technology-imposed 
identity pressures can impose risks of harm, although the possibility 
of, kind, and extent of harm the individual suffer may be unforesee-
able. The reference to unforeseeable risks in informed consent to re-
search principles thus could be interpreted to include incidental find-
ings that may exert pressure on an individual’s life narrative. In 
summary, a broadly interpreted notion of informed consent to re-
search—and an expanded notion of informed consent to treatment—
could be used to address the identity concerns raised by structural 
and functional brain scanning. 
 Once individuals are informed about the possibility of incidental 
findings, they can attempt to control the revelation of those findings 
back to themselves. Of course, a legal document that identifies in 
writing the possibility of fMRI incidental findings would not, stand-
ing alone, allow an individual to control the receipt of incidental find-
ings.447 An ethically desirable informed consent process would make 
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each individual personally aware of the possibility of incidental find-
ings, provide examples of information that may be incidentally dis-
covered, and navigate the boundaries of the individual’s right to con-
trol her receipt of that information.448 For example, the parties could 
negotiate a notification processes to be followed in the event of both 
clinically significant and insignificant findings. Individuals who feel 
that they are not vulnerable to changes in their life narratives may 
request to receive both clinically significant and insignificant find-
ings. At the same time, individuals who are vulnerable to changes in 
their life narratives may elect to receive clinically significant inciden-
tal findings but not findings relating to personal characteristics and 
traits. Individuals who do not wish to be notified even of clinically 
significant findings may wish to decline to participate in the re-
search.449 
VII.   A CASE FOR NEURO EXCEPTIONALISM? 
 A number of ethical and legal principles potentially apply to pro-
tect confidentiality, privacy, and identity in the functional neuroi-
maging context. Are these protections adequate? Are additional pro-
tections needed? To answer these questions, I first must address the 
scope of the confidentiality, privacy, and identity concerns raised by 
fMRI examinations. 
A.   A Technological Straw Man? 
 The scope of the confidentiality, privacy, and identity concerns 
raised by fMRI depends, in part, on the information that the technol-
ogy has the potential to reveal.450 If an fMRI only was capable of 
mapping speech, language, and motor functions to assist with neuro-
surgery or of identifying neurological impairments, then the confi-
dentiality, privacy, and identity concerns raised thereby would be 
very similar to those raised by traditional, albeit sensitive, medical 
record information. Policies and procedures designed to protect sensi-
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tive information, such as mental health records, would be instructive 
and, perhaps, sufficient to protect neuroimaging information if their 
application was extended.  
 On the other hand, if fMRI somehow became a generally accepted 
technology for identifying an individual’s sexual preferences, evaluat-
ing the morality of her decisions, or measuring the deceitfulness of 
her actions, the technology would challenge existing confidentiality 
and privacy schemes, which tend to protect health information, not 
social characteristics and behaviors. Because we cannot predict ex-
actly how quickly and accurately fMRI technology will develop, we 
are left to debate whether the threats to the confidentiality of neuro-
imaging information and to cognitive privacy are real or imagined.451 
The development of commercial fMRI lie detectors was believed to be 
several years away at the time I began to research this Article. Now, 
one company is directly marking its brain scanning services to the 
general public.452 This threat to cognitive privacy has gone from 
imagined to real in the space of two years. 
 The scope of the confidentiality, privacy, and identity concerns 
raised by fMRI also depends on the technology’s perceived potential. 
Even though fMRI may never be capable of accurately reading an in-
dividual’s mind, confidentiality, privacy, and identity may be threat-
ened if private organizations and governmental agencies believe that 
it is. A mandatory fMRI that accurately reveals an individual’s 
thoughts is one thing. A mandatory fMRI that is incorrectly inter-
preted to reveal what is believed to be the individual’s thought, char-
acteristic, or behavior and that is used to her detriment in an em-
ployment, criminal justice, or insurance capacity is another.453 The 
fMRI, like other sophisticated technologies, “possess[es] an illusory 
accuracy and objectivity”454 that can be dangerous in the hands of 
employers, insurers, jurors, lawyers, judges, and government officials 
who lack the scientific and statistical training necessary to under-
stand published fMRI studies and interpret fMRI test results.455 Yet, 
these are the individuals to whom commercial fMRI lie detectors are 
currently being marketed.456 For these reasons, I do not believe that 
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the act of identifying and carefully discussing the confidentiality, 
privacy, and identity implications of fMRI contributes to the creation 
of technological straw men.457 
B.   Responsible Discussion 
 In Part III I found that some of the scientists who conduct neuro-
imaging studies use care when publishing their findings and even 
expressly caution against inappropriate or too eager interpretations 
and applications of fMRI. However, I also found that descriptions of 
neuroimaging research in the popular media—including physicians’, 
lawyers’, bioethicists’, and some scientists’ statements to the media—
are not as constrained.458 I argued in Part III that scientists need to 
continue the care with which they describe their research findings 
and the diligence with which they identify appropriate and inappro-
priate uses of neuroimaging information.459 
 Here, I want to emphasize that neuroscientists have a role in the 
public, not just the scientific, arena, which includes identifying limi-
tations and cautioning against unwarranted extensions of research 
findings.460 Scientists, rather than non-scientifically trained lawyers 
and ethicists, are in the best position to clarify how research findings 
should be interpreted.461 In the context of genetics, some have pro-
posed that scientists study during graduate school “the social impli-
cations of science and the historical instances where scientists have 
spoken out.”462 This proposal makes sense in the context of neurosci-
ence too. Many graduate science students take a required one-credit 
course in the ethics of scientific research, which may cover topics 
such as “the philosophy of science, practice of scientific research, con-
flicts of interest, and the value conflicts that arise between scientists 
and society at large.”463 The course I took did not specifically address 
how private and governmental institutions may attempt to incorpo-
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rate scientific findings into their business decisions or the role scien-
tists play in describing their research to the media and identifying 
appropriate and inappropriate uses of scientific information. These 
topics can—and should—be included in graduate science education.   
 I have focused on the social responsibilities of scientists, but law-
yers, bioethicists, and others who contribute to media reports and the 
neuroethics literature have equal responsibilities. We need to ensure 
that our excitement about fMRI, as expressed through statements to 
the media and during other public discussions, does not increase the 
risk of therapeutic illusions, therapeutic extravagance, and thera-
peutic futility. Therapeutic illusions exist when patients, family 
members, and other stakeholders believe that a particular medical 
treatment or research protocol will improve a patient’s condition, 
when in all likelihood it will have no beneficial effect.464 Therapeutic 
extravagance involves “the provision of high-cost treatments that of-
fer little or no benefit.”465 Therapeutic futility refers to “the provision 
of treatments that offer little or no benefit and, thus, are wasteful.”466 
 For example, nonscientists should not suggest that fMRI is capa-
ble of distinguishing between persistently vegetative or minimally 
conscious patients or of assisting them in emerging from uncon-
sciousness when it cannot do so.467 Nonscientists should expressly 
state that they are speculating when they are doing so, attempt to 
incorporate current science studies into any speculation in which 
they do engage, and avoid speculation that has no basis in the scien-
tific literature. When New York Times reporter Benedict Carey 
stated that “[a]t this rate, it seems that neuroscientists will soon pin-
point the regions in the brain where mediocre poetry is generated, 
where high school grudges are lodged, where sarcasm blooms like a 
red rose,”468 I realized that Mr. Carey was exaggerating—given that 
my research had revealed no fMRI studies examining the neural cor-
relates of poetry, high school grudges, or sarcasm—but the general 
public may not have. 
 Of course, the need for caution in identifying and describing scien-
tific findings must be balanced with the need to avoid over-
conservative publication and reporting, which could increase the risk 
of therapeutic nihilism (the failure to recognize the possible benefits 
of treatment) and therapeutic neglect (a patient’s lack of access to 
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treatment from which she could benefit).469 For example, the findings 
of some fMRI deception studies have the potential to assist patients 
who have addictive disorders in which deception, or the ability to 
conceal information, plays a prominent role.470 The findings of other 
fMRI studies involving known pedophiles may provide information 
that is valuable to their treatment.471  
 Although Part III identifies a handful of fMRI studies that have 
generated the most speculation about their application in nonre-
search settings, the media has not covered the thousands of other 
fMRI studies the goals of which are to further treatment of the stud-
ied conditions. Publication and accurate reporting of these studies is 
necessary for progress in medicine and science. Like so many other 
issues in ethics, then, scientific findings require balanced presenta-
tion by scientists and nonscientists. 
C.   The Analogy to HIV Exceptionalism and Genetic Exceptionalism 
 HIV exceptionalism and genetic exceptionalism refer to the claims 
that HIV test results and genetic information are so different from 
other types of health information that they deserve exceptional 
measures.472 HIV exceptionalism was introduced to health care in the 
first decade of the epidemic through special “pre- and post-test coun-
seling, anonymous testing, and stringent protections of confidential-
ity”.473 Genetic exceptionalism was implemented when over forty 
states passed statutes “prohibiting genetic discrimination in health 
insurance; two-thirds of the states . . . enacted laws prohibiting ge-
netic discrimination in employment”; and a handful of other states 
enacted various provisions addressing “genetic discrimination in life 
insurance, genetic privacy, and genetic testing.”474 Congress also has 
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attempted to pass legislation prohibiting genetic discrimination in 
both the health insurance and employment contexts.475 
 The question thus becomes whether implementation of a third 
generation of exceptionalism—neuro exceptionalism476—is desirable. 
Are special or heightened confidentiality, privacy, and identity pro-
tections necessary to protect functional neuroimaging information? 
Several reasons have been given for exceptional genetic provisions, 
and an analysis of these reasons, and their criticisms, can inform the 
neuro exceptionalism debate. 
 One argument for genetic exceptionalism relates to genetic proph-
ecy and kin.477 According to this argument, genetic information is a 
“future diary” that can predict an individual’s (and her biological 
family members’) future physical and mental health conditions and 
can influence these individuals’ views of their life possibilities.478 
These future diaries are believed to require special protections.479 
Critics of the genetic prophecy argument emphasize that replication 
studies show that claimed associations between genetic variations 
and particular diseases do not always exist, many predictions are in-
accurate, the strengths of accurate predictions vary greatly, and 
treatments do not exist for all of the conditions that can be pre-
dicted.480  
 Because some fMRI studies involve health conditions in which 
genes play a role, a brain scan that is used to study or is interpreted 
to reveal the precursors of one of these conditions could have implica-
tions for individuals and their biological family members in a manner 
similar to genetic information. A genetic basis for brain wiring in 
humans481 and the current interest in identifying genetic markers 
that might be linked to phenotypes that are accessible by fMRI fur-
ther support this argument.482 Speculation that fMRI might be used 
to predict non-health-related conditions, including intelligence, like-
lihood of committing future crimes, and social behavior,483 parallel 
some of the predictive concerns raised by genetics. And, as discussed 
in Part VI, fMRI can construct alternative narratives that can affect 
an individual’s view of her identity and life’s possibilities. On the 
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other hand, the unknown accuracy of fMRI predictions, as well as the 
lack of available treatments for many of the conditions discovered by 
fMRI, also must be considered. The first argument for genetic excep-
tionalism and its criticisms thus apply to some extent in the func-
tional neuroimaging context. 
 A second reason given for genetic exceptionalism is that genetic 
information carries a stigma and that eugenics, racism, and genocide 
are the unfortunate results of the inappropriate use of genetic infor-
mation.484 It is fair to say that fMRI technology probably is still too 
new for functional neuroimaging information results to carry a wide-
spread stigma; however, this may rapidly change as fMRI use ex-
tends outside of the research context and more functional neuroimag-
ing information is created, used, and disclosed in the private and 
government sectors. Additionally, although functional neuroimaging 
information may not currently carry a widespread stigma, fMRI 
scans have been interpreted to reveal neural activations that are cor-
related with certain mental health conditions, addictive behaviors, 
cognitive abilities, and sexual preferences, all of which the NIH con-
siders sensitive or stigmatizing in other contexts.485 Thus, the second 
reason for genetic exceptionalism also could support neuro excep-
tionalism, although research revealed no attempts to improve the 
human species by encouraging or permitting reproduction of only 
those individuals whose brain functions are judged desirable through 
review of fMRI scans (although, of course, related speculation does 
exist).486 
 A third reason given for genetic exceptionalism is that the public 
regards it as unique.487 Although the public might not currently re-
gard functional neuroimaging information as unique due to the rela-
tive newness of fMRI technology, the public may in the near future 
consider it so due in part to the frequency with which fMRI studies 
are covered by the media, including the New York Times, which has 
featured fMRI technology in at least fifty-two articles.488 Of course, 
relying on public regard as a reason for heightened confidentiality 
and privacy protections has been criticized on the grounds that it is 
self-fulfilling.489 Stated another way, the public might regard specific 
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types of information as unique because information-specific legisla-
tion or regulation is passed.490  
 A fourth reason given for heightened protection for genetic infor-
mation is that other sensitive or potentially stigmatizing types of 
health information receive special protection. Congress has enacted 
special protections that apply to certain alcohol and drug abuse pa-
tient records;491 many states have passed laws that provide special 
confidentiality protections for HIV/AIDS test results492 and mental 
health records;493 and even the HIPAA Privacy Rule, which generally 
applies one uniform level of protection to all types of individually 
identifiable health information, provides heightened confidentiality 
protections for psychotherapy notes.494 However, critics argue that 
genetic information is unlike these other types of information, which 
can be separated from general medical records with relative ease.495 
Because genes play a role in many diseases and genetic information 
can be based on family history or revealed through thousands of dif-
ferent types of tests, it is more difficult for health care providers to 
separate genetic information from general health information.496 
Unlike genetic information, however, fMRI scans and their related 
reports could be maintained separately from general medical records 
with relative ease. 
 Other arguments support genetic exceptionalism. For example, 
greater political support may exist for genetic nondiscrimination leg-
islation than for more general legislation.497 Those working within 
the field of neuroethics are clearly grappling with the pros and cons 
of neuro exceptionalism,498 although it is unclear whether more (or 
any) political support currently exists for neuro-specific legislation 
compared to general confidentiality and privacy protections.  
 In summary, many of the reasons given for genetic exceptionalism 
also could be used to support neuro exceptionalism, although many of 
the criticisms of genetic exceptionalism also apply in the functional 
neuroimaging context. Perhaps the most important factor—whether 
existing confidentiality, privacy, and identity protections adequately 
protect neuroimaging information and the individuals whose brains 
have been scanned—has been overlooked. 
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D.   Neuro Exceptional and Generic Options 
 As shown in Part IV, the Common Rule, the Privacy Rule, state li-
censing laws, and Public Health Service provisions establishing cer-
tificates of confidentiality do contain provisions that may protect the 
confidentiality of some functional neuroimaging information. How-
ever, the Common Rule, the Privacy Rule, and state licensing laws 
regulate a limited class of individuals and organizations. Both the 
Privacy Rule and state licensing laws contain a number of exceptions 
to confidentiality, many of which may be implicated in the functional 
neuroimaging context. And, neither the Privacy Rule nor many state 
laws prohibit individuals from authorizing disclosures of their func-
tional neuroimaging information to third parties, such as employers 
and insurers. Functional neuroimaging information, thus, has in-
complete confidentiality protections. 
 Efforts to expand the application of the Common Rule, the Privacy 
Rule, and state licensure laws to regulate all of the individuals and 
organizations who wish to create and use functional neuroimaging 
information currently are not likely to be successful.499 Efforts to es-
tablish stand-alone, heightened confidentiality protections for func-
tional neuroimaging information might have a greater chance of suc-
cess, although the desirability of, and practical issues raised by, such 
efforts require evaluation too. One option thus is to give functional 
neuroimaging information heightened confidentiality protections. 
The Privacy Rule already regulates the use and disclosure of psycho-
therapy notes—personal notes that help the therapist recall a ther-
apy discussion and may relate, for example, to the content of a cli-
ent’s dream—more stringently than other types of health informa-
tion.500 Perhaps federal or state laws could treat functional neuroi-
maging information like psychotherapy notes. Psychotherapy notes 
actually make a nice analogy to some types of functional neuroimag-
ing information, especially fMRI test results that are interpreted to 
reveal an individual’s thoughts and feelings. Consideration of this 
neuro exceptional proposal requires several hurdles to be cleared. 
 One hurdle is that any heightened confidentiality protections 
would need to be balanced against the legitimate activities for which 
the law already supports the use and disclosure of health informa-
tion. For example, if fMRI could accurately—and the key word is ac-
curately—determine whether an individual is a rapist or murderer, 
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public policy might support the use and disclosure of the individual’s 
functional neuroimaging information for law enforcement pur-
poses.501 On the other hand, public policy might support maintaining 
the confidentiality of functional neuroimaging information in situa-
tions in which fMRI remains an experimental cognitive neuroscience 
tool. Proposed neuro exceptional confidentiality provisions thus need 
to be rebalanced against stated needs to use and disclosure health in-
formation as required by law and for needs relating to reimburse-
ment, health care operations, public health, the detection of victims 
of abuse and neglect, health oversight, judicial and administrative 
proceedings, law enforcement, research, serious threats to health and 
safety, specialized government functions, and workers’ compensa-
tion.502 
 A neuro exceptional confidentiality provision also would require a 
corresponding definition of protected functional neuroimaging infor-
mation. In genetic exceptionalism, defining genetic information has 
proved difficult, in part because it requires a determination of 
whether genetic information should be narrowly defined to include 
only genetic test results or broadly defined to include family history. 
Defining functional neuroimaging information should be easier, al-
though decisions still would need to be made about the types of func-
tional neuroimages—such as fMRI, positron emission tomography 
(PET), and single-photon emission computed tomography (SPECT) 
images—that would be included, and about the scope of included in-
terpretations and reports. Protecting image interpretations and re-
lated reports would seem to be important given that many fMRI im-
ages are meaningless without knowledge of the mental tasks that 
were assigned to the individual during the examination, the timing 
of the BOLD contrast, and the radiologist or scientist’s interpretation 
of such contrast. 
 The main problem with blanket neuro exceptional confidentiality 
provisions is that many of the conditions and characteristics that 
have the potential to be revealed by fMRI are not that exceptional. 
Neurological conditions and disorders such as a brain tumor, stroke, 
persistent vegetative state, minimally conscious state, depression, 
schizophrenia, bipolar disorder, alcohol addiction, cocaine addiction, 
and compulsive eating can be sensitive and stigmatizing. However, 
they are not terribly unique, especially in the neurology and psychia-
try settings. Applying heightened confidentiality protections to an 
expensive fMRI test that reveals a brain tumor but not to a less ex-
                                                                                                                    
 501. See, e.g., 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(f) (2006) (Privacy Rule provision allowing protected 
health information to be used and disclosed without patient authorization for certain law 
enforcement activities). 
 502. See, e.g., id. §§ 164.506, -.512(a)(l) (Privacy Rule provisions attempting to balance 
confidentiality rights against various needs to use and disclose information). 
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pensive x-ray examination that reveals the same brain tumor also 
could give providers incentive to use less expensive (and less sensi-
tive) diagnostic equipment to avoid neuro exceptional administrative 
costs. 
 What is unique about fMRI is its potential to reveal insights about 
an individual’s thoughts, feelings, preferences, prejudices, and other 
social characteristics and behaviors. Neuro exceptional confidential-
ity provisions that protect just these insights might garner more 
support, although crafting a definition of functional neuroimaging in-
formation that includes only unique insights (and not routine neuro-
logical impairments) would be difficult. 
 Neuro exceptional privacy provisions might be easier to craft. Be-
cause confidentiality provisions continue to allow providers and sci-
entists to disclose functional neuroimaging information pursuant to 
compelled authorizations, one privacy option is to prohibit employers, 
insurers, and other organizations from collecting fMRI test results 
pursuant to voluntary and compelled authorizations. A second option 
is to prohibit these organizations from conducting their own fMRI 
examinations of applicants for employment, insurance, and other 
benefits. The EPPA prohibition against use by private employers of 
lie detection devices and test results might be used as a model for a 
law codifying these two options.  
 A broad example of such a law (perhaps, the “Functional Neuroi-
maging Protection Act”) could make it unlawful for employers and 
insurers to require, request, suggest, or cause any employee, insuree, 
or applicant for employment or insurance to take or submit to any 
functional neuroimaging test or to use, accept, refer to, or inquire 
concerning the results of any functional neuroimaging test. The law 
would require a corresponding definition of functional neuroimaging 
test as well as clarification regarding the neuroimaging technologies 
and testing procedures that would constitute functional neuroimag-
ing tests. A narrower version of such a law could prohibit employers, 
health insurers, and life insurers from using any health or social in-
formation, including functional neuroimaging information for non-
job-related purposes at any stage of employment, to deny basic 
health insurance coverage, or to deny one small life insurance policy, 
respectively.503 
                                                                                                                    
 503. See also Rothstein, supra note 350, at 478 (making a similar recommendation in 
the context of genetics). 
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VIII.   CONCLUSION 
 As fMRI poses minimal health risks,504 its most significant risks 
may be potential breaches of confidentiality, invasions of cognitive 
privacy, and the construction of alternative identities. I thus recom-
mend (1) implementation and enforcement of existing confidentiality 
and privacy rights while neuro exceptional proposals are being con-
sidered; (2) the development of non-neuro exceptional provisions that 
prohibit the use of health and social information by employers for 
non-job-related purposes at any stage of employment, by health in-
surers to deny basic health insurance coverage, and by life insurers 
to deny one small life insurance policy; and (3) the incorporation of 
incidental findings within the doctrine of informed consent. 
 My first recommendation—implementation and enforcement of 
existing confidentiality and privacy rights—is an efficient interim 
measure. Health care providers and scientists must be made aware 
of the confidentiality, privacy, and identity issues raised by fMRI and 
should develop internal measures to protect their patients and re-
search subjects. These measures, which should be designed to re-
spond to the obvious confidentiality and privacy risks posed by fMRI, 
should address the removal of raw facial image elements and other 
identifiers from neuroimaging information; the establishment of best 
practices relating to the short and long-term storage of raw neuroi-
maging data; the development of policies and procedures relating to 
incidental findings, including policies and procedures for notification 
of the individual who is the subject of the findings and the process for 
treatment referral; and the application for certificates of confidential-
ity by scientists who create sensitive functional neuroimaging infor-
mation. 
 My second recommendation—the development of generic privacy 
protections in the employment, health, and life insurance contexts—
responds to gaps in existing confidentiality and antidiscrimination 
laws that allow employers and insurers to force individuals to au-
thorize disclosures of their health information, including their func-
tional neuroimaging information. I recommend generic, rather than 
neuro exceptional, privacy provisions to avoid a number of substan-
tive, practical, and administrative concerns. These concerns include 
protecting functional neuroimaging information that is not excep-
tional, crafting a definition of functional neuroimaging information 
that protects only unique information, and imposing higher adminis-
trative costs on providers and scientists who use fMRI. 
                                                                                                                    
 504. Norris, supra note 12, at 794 (“studies on healthy subjects can be performed with-
out harmful side effects”). 
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 My third recommendation—incorporation of incidental findings 
within the doctrine of informed consent—will help give individuals 
more control over the construction of their identities. Knowing the 
possibility of incidental findings, the types of incidental findings that 
can be made, and the identity pressures these findings can pose can 
help individuals structure their life narratives in a way that provides 
the most coherence and meaning. 
 Of course, additional considerations are necessary. Consultation 
with neuroscientists and other qualified individuals who understand 
the limitations of fMRI research and the meaning of fMRI test re-
sults should be required prior to any use of fMRI outside the clinical 
and research contexts, especially because fMRI remains experimen-
tal in many of its uses. Scientists should consider their role in in-
forming the public about the proper uses of fMRI and permissible in-
terpretations of test results. And bioethicists, lawyers, and others 
should consider ways of exploring the ethical, legal, and social impli-
cations of advances in neuroimaging technology without contributing 
to technology hype. 
 Advances in science and technology frequently raise new ethical, 
legal, and social issues. Developments in neuroscience and neuroi-
maging technology are no exception. The potential of fMRI to reveal 
thoughts, characteristics, and social behaviors poses a significant 
challenge to existing confidentiality and privacy provisions, many of 
which were designed to protect health information. Identification of 
the considerable gaps in coverage can inform policy discussions about 
the need to protect confidentiality, privacy, and identity as attempts 
to transfer fMRI technology outside the research context are made. 
 
